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Australia‘s involvement in the rejection of the Japanese racial equality clause, at the Peace 
Conference of 1919, has been noted by contemporaries and historians as a significant event in 
Australia‘s nationalism. Often portrayed as Prime Minister William Morris Hughes‘ struggle 
to preserve White Australia and therefore the nation, sources and opinions divergent from 
Hughes‘ have not been fully explored. A contrast of these sources to the traditional legacy of 
the episode using a thematic framework of nation, labour and defence, demonstrates the 
significance that the denial of the clause had on Australia and the complexity of discussion it 
inspired. 
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The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 stands as a milestone for Australian nationalism. 
Federation had only been achieved eighteen years earlier, so the conference was one of the 
first instances in which representatives of the nation participated in an international forum 
which extended beyond the British Empire. Australia and the other self-governing Dominions 
had been granted the opportunity to have their own delegates attend the Conference. This had 
been demanded by the Dominions, especially since they had to not been consulted about the 
conditions of the armistice or most specifically the acceptance of United States‘ President 
Woodrow Wilson‘s fourteen points. They therefore wanted to guarantee that Dominion 
interests would be represented in the peace settlement.
1
 Hence Versailles was the first 
opportunity for the diplomatic expression of individualised, specific national interests.  
Of critical importance to the Australian delegation was the Japanese proposal to insert a racial 
equality clause into the League of Nations covenant. This clause, which initially was 
presented as an amendment to Article 21 on religious freedom and later as an included phrase 
to the preamble of the covenant, advocated that a country‘s foreign nationals should be given 
fair and equal treatment despite their race or nationality.
2
 As indicated in an article by the 
Melbourne Argus, written at the conclusion of the conference, since the proposal indicated 
equal treatment of races, in whatever nation they were in, a large portion of the Australian 
public feared that the policy of White Australia would be in jeopardy. Referring to the 
                                                 
1
 For the protest of the Dominions see L. F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger1914-1954: William Morris Hughes 
A Political Biography Volume II, (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1979)  pp. 362-9;  Neville Meaney, A History of 
Australian Defence and Foreign Policy 1901-32: Volume 2, Australia and World Crisis 1914-23, (Sydney: 
Sydney University Press, 2009), pp. 301-9. 
2
 The two versions of the clause presented to the Paris commission follow. The clause as presented to the 
commission on the 13
th
 February 1919: ‗The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, 
the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all alien nationals of states, members of the 
League, equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of 
their race or nationality‘; The proposal as presented as an addition to the preamble on the 11th April 1919:  …by 
the endorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals…‘; both sourced 
from Naoko Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality: the Racial Equality Proposal of 1919, (London: Routledge, 
1998), pp. 20, 27. 
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wording of the original clause: that equal treatment should be given ‗making no distinction, 
either in law or in fact‘, the reporter pointed out that White Australia as a discriminatory 
system of preventing immigration, especially Asiatic, by dictation test, did in fact make such 
a distinction and therefore the threat was credible.
3
  
. Historian Naoko Shimazu indicates that the clause was not intended to acknowledge 
universal racial rights, and was in fact advocated to establish Japanese nationalism. Japan‘s 
main desire in including the clause was to ensure that it would not be humiliated in the new 
international order of the League of Nations; Japan did not want to be identified as an inferior 
coloured nation in the realm of the great white powers.
4
 Furthermore, in the period of the 
early twentieth century, when the Conference took place, Japan was still in the early stages of 
national development. It had not been until after the gunboat diplomacy of American 
Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853 and the development of the Meiji restoration, that Japan 
had ended its policy of sakoku (closed country) in relation to the west and began to engage as 
a international player as dictated by western forms of nationalism.
 5
   
Therefore, coincidentally Japan and Australia both saw the clause as an issue of national 
importance. Australians had perceived a threat to national sovereignty within the proposal, 
while Japan believed it to be a declaration of national rights. From this it is evident that clash 
between the two nations was inevitable. Contemporaries and historians have portrayed the 
struggle over the proposal as Australia‘s, and more often than not Hughes‘s, fight to preserve 
and establish the Australian nation by protecting White Australia. This dissertation hopes 
expand on this to address the question of what were the wider discussions regarding the racial 
equality clause in Australia? What impression did the clause have on Australians‘ 
                                                 
3
 Untitled, The Argus, 12 September  1919, p. 6. 
4
 Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, pp. 88, 113-4. 
5
 For ideal of sakoku see W. G. Beasley, The Modern History of Japan, ( London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1973), pp. 2-3; For the end of the sakoku system and arrival of Commodore Perry see pp. 57-75; For the growth 
of nationalism that stemmed from the Meiji reforms and external threat from the West see pp. 56, 155; and that 
this continued to the Paris Conference, pp.196-7. 
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understandings of the nation and White Australia, given the event was also a significant 
aspect of Japan‘s nationalism? How were these ideals discussed as Australians reflected on 
Australia‘s new status as an international player? 
To understand how the notion of a nation existed at the time of the Peace Conference this 
thesis takes on Benedict Anderson‘s proposal of viewing the nation as an imagined 
community which is both limited and sovereign. A nation is limited because it is finite to a 
certain group of people, and it is sovereign, because sovereignty represents the freedom a 
state has, which is the condition for each nation and its territorial claims.
6
 However, this is 
expanded upon through the idea that a nation at the Peace Conference was defined by both 
scientific and theoretical notions specific to the intellectual context of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth. Glenda Sluga‘s work The Nation, Psychology, and International Politics, is 
informative on this point in that she presents how scientific schools such as psychology, and 
theoretical doctrines such as Darwinism, were the building blocks which theorists of this 
period used to understand the ‗nation‘. She argues that these ideas were used in an attempt to 
create the new, more democratic, world order that the League strove towards. However, these 
ideals also led to a conclusion that psychological difference existed between the races and the 
sexes. This along with the idea of self-determination meant that the nation was seen in terms 
of progress, individual direction and individualised characteristics (racial and 
psychological).
7
  
This thesis maintains that Australia was no exception to this form of nation: as the events of 
the Peace Conference were clearly defined in terms of sovereignty and progress, through 
themes like labour and defence.  Here the Australian nation was formed as a self-determined 
collective with white race purity being the individualised characteristic which limited the 
                                                 
6
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,  revised 
edition (London; New York: Verso, 1991), pp. 5-7. 
7
 Glenda Sluga, The Nation, Psychology, and Intentional Politics, (Sydney: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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community. However, it will be argued that this formation was complicated by the rise of 
Japan, which challenged the superiority of community based on white race purity. 
The historiography of Australia‘s role at the Versailles Conference, and particularly the 
actions taken to reject the clause, often connects the episode to the issues of the development 
of the ideology White Australia, Australia‘s tense relationship to Japan and the idea of an 
Australian nation. The authors who have contributed to the most to this discussion are L. F. 
Fitzhardinge, W. J. Hudson, Peter Spartalis, Neville Meaney, Marilyn Lake, Henry Reynolds 
and Naoko Shimazu. Each of these authors deals with how White Australia, and the necessity 
of preserving it, contributed to the rejection of the amendment. Nevertheless, these authors 
fail to recognise the diversity of opinions around the clause and assume White Australia was 
an unmalleable idea. In fact where this thesis expands upon the current historiography is 
scope, focusing on sources that reveal how malleable White Australia was to Australians and 
how a great diversity of opinion, especially in terms of national preservation and the Japanese 
relationship, formed around Australia‘s new international circumstances.  
Fitzhardinge, in his two volume biography on Hughes, deals with the events of Paris and the 
rejection of the racial equality clause as a significant aspect of Hughes‘ political career.  This 
work focuses entirety on Hughes and how he interacted with the issues of Japanese relations 
and White Australia. In this way Fitzhardinge demonstrates how, to Hughes, White Australia 
was the best method by which racial conflict could be avoided, labour conditions guaranteed 
and defence maintained against an enemy like Japan.
8
 However, Fitzhardinge‘s works are 
limited as they primarily serve as a biography of Hughes‘ life and therefore do not focus on 
the larger, diverse picture of Australian discussion over the Versailles Conference, White 
Australia and racial equality. When Australian opinion is related it is generalised with little or 
no explanation of the complexity of topics, like White Australia: 
                                                 
8
 Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger, p. 147. 
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Hughes attitude was by no means peculiar to him or to the Labor Party. It was shared by all parties 
and almost all Australians.
9
 
In fact, as Meaney persuasively argues, Fitzhardinge‘s works strive to defend Hughes‘ 
actions and therefore tend to dismiss views that were critical of Hughes.
10
 Fitzhardinge works 
are most useful in understanding how the events of Paris lent to the formulation of the 
Australian nation in that he relates the history of the struggle for Dominion self-
representation.
11
 Nevertheless he does not explicitly focus on how a sense of nationality was 
created by Paris or how issues of labour and defence, or even the ideal of White Australia, 
were tied up in the ideas of the nation.  
In contrast Hudson demonstrates how Australia‘s involvement in the Paris Peace Conference 
was a significant advancement in Australia‘s national status. He indicates that the rejection of 
the Japanese proposal at the Conference was greater than simply a racist assumption or even 
adherence to the ideal of White Australia. Indeed his work is useful to understand how the 
Conference helped to develop the Australian nation in reaction to the position of Japan. 
Hudson argues that Hughes, and the majority of Australians, viewed the Japanese amendment 
as a threat to both Australia‘s labour conditions and security, and therefore Australian 
sovereignty and progress.
12
 However, in a similar vein to Fitzhardinge, Hudson‘s work is 
limited by the lack of scope. As the title of main work: Billy Hughes in Paris, suggests, he 
relates the events of Paris as part of Hughes‘ story. Hudson maintains Hughes was simply an 
agent for White Australia and uses the words of the Australian delegate John Latham to 
describe Australian opinion of White Australia: ‗no govt would last a day if it tampered with 
                                                 
9
 Ibid, p. 148. 
10
 For Fitzhardinge‘s defence of Hughes actions in regard to the racial equality clause see Ibid, p. 416-7; For 
Meaney‘s criticisms see Meaney, Australia and World Crisis, pp. 398-9. 
11
 Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger, pp. 362-9. 
12
 W. J. Hudson, Billy Hughes in Paris: the Birth of Australian Diplomacy, (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson 
Australia, 1978), pp. xi-xii, 54-9.  
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[it]‘. In fact, Hudson also generalises White Australia and the Japanese relationship with 
Hughes assertions: 
White Australia still was almost universally revered and Hughes at Paris reflected that reverence. 
Concern about Japan existed and Hughes reflected that concern.
13
 
Although Hudson relates how members of the delegation and the Australian parliament had 
concern over Hughes‘ lack of diplomacy at Versailles, he does not directly link these with the 
issues of Australian-Japanese relations or even difference in understandings of White 
Australia, which this thesis hopes to demonstrate existed.
14
  
In comparison Spartalis relates how the critical position of some members of the delegation 
and officials in Hughes‘ government, was linked to the issues over the Japanese demand. 
Referring to the opinion of Australian delegate Frederic Eggleston and the Director of the 
Pacific Branch of the Prime Minister‘s Department Major Edmund Piesse, Spartalis 
demonstrates that while they supported the idea of White Australia, these figures criticised 
Hughes‘ methods of dealing with the Japanese as being counterproductive to Australia‘s 
interests.
15
 However, Spartalis also generalises public Australian opinion of White Australia. 
He too conveys that almost all Australians supported the policy and once again relies on 
Latham‘s quote that no election could be won by a government that ran against it.16 In fact, 
unlike Hudson, Spartalis does not even convey how deeper themes were involved in the ideal 
of White Australia, such as labour or defence, or how these contributed to discussion over 
White Australia and racial equality. 
Meaney also establishes how some Australian figures were quite critical of Hughes‘ 
undiplomatic negotiations with the Japanese over the racial equality clause. In fact Meaney 
                                                 
13
 Ibid, p. 60. 
14
 For Hudson‘s discussion of Hughes‘ diplomacy and his critics see Ibid, pp. 60-7. 
15
 Peter Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, (Sydney : Hale & Iremonger, 1983).pp. 188-9. 
16
 Ibid, pp.175-77. 
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dedicates a large portion of his work on the episode to the opinion of Major Piesse.
17
 Meaney 
demonstrates how Piesse was very critical of Hughes‘ actions at Paris believing that he had 
needlessly antagonised the Japanese.
18
 Meaney‘s work, Towards a New Vision Australia and 
Japan through 100 Years, serves as comprehensive analysis of Japanese-Australian relations 
from the earliest encounters through to the present era. It is therefore useful as it presents a 
history of how the ideal of White Australia conflicted with forming a positive relationship 
with Japan.
19
 Meaney‘s other work, Australia and World Crisis, also establishes how the 
separate representation that had been granted to the Dominions at the 1918 Imperial 
Conference, the preparatory meeting of the Empire before Versailles, was a significant aspect 
of Australian nation building.
20
 Nevertheless, Meaney does not demonstrate how public 
opinion conceived the racial equality episode or its repercussions on White Australia, with his 
focus mostly on Piesse. This means that he does not engage with problems, which this 
dissertation hopes to address, like the issues surrounding the ‗Empty North‘ or Australian 
internationalism.  
Lake and Reynolds, in similarity to Hudson and Meaney, show how the formulation of White 
Australia as an Australian national foundation was a complex issue which involved concerns 
over defence, democratic labour conditions and the relationship with Japan. Indeed of all the 
literature which deals with the Australian involvement in rejecting the amendment, Lake and 
Reynolds work is the most in depth when exploring the wider history of White Australia and 
its position in an international doctrine of ―Whiteness‖.21  They point out how White 
Australia was embroiled in both defence and labour issues. In terms of defence they refer to 
                                                 
17
 In fact he has written a short work entirely dedicated to Piesse: Neville Meaney, Fears and Phobias: E. L. 
Piesse and the problem of Japan 1909-39, (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 1996). 
18
 Neville Meaney, Towards a New Vision: Australia and Japan through 100 Years (East Roseville, N.S.W.: 
Kangaroo Press, 1999), pp. 70, 73. 
19
 Meany gives a comprehensive overview which includes an analysis of White Australia and race nationalism: 
Ibid, pp. 9-36. 
20
 Meaney, Australia and World Crisis, pp. 363-4. 
21
 Lake, Marilyn, and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the 
Question of Racial Equality. Australian ed. (Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Publishing, 2008), pp. 137-65. 
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the tension that developed over the military potential of the Asiatic nations with discussion of 
the ‗yellow peril‘ and the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war.22 In regards to labour 
they show how the policy‘s was established in democratic labour ideals dependent on racial 
exclusion, such as Justice Higgins‘s harvester judgement and the end of indentured Kanaka 
labour.
23
 In fact they demonstrate how, throughout its history, critics challenged hard-line 
notions of White Australia. This establishes that this criticism was sustained from those who 
challenged it close to its inception into policy, i.e. the 1901 immigration restrictions act,
24
 to 
an interesting case at the time of the Peace Conference, where the Women‘s Political 
Association questioned Hughes attack on the clause, unfortunately they do not expand upon 
this case.
25
 However, besides the afore mentioned example they do not apply this schema to 
the diverse range of voices who, at the time of the events and in the decade following, 
commented on White Australia‘s place in reaction to the rejection of the clause. When they 
deal with the racial equality clause, Australia‘s part in story is dominated by Hughes. Indeed 
they only briefly mention Piesse and Latham and once again rely on Latham‘s quote to gauge 
the opinion of Australians.
26
 
Naoko Shimazu‘s book: Japan, Race and Equality, stands as the most comprehensive 
account of the clause simply as it focuses solely on it and attempts to catalogue the history of 
all players involved. Shimazu‘s work establishes how Australia played a major role in the 
denial of the Japanese proposal. She also demonstrates how Australia‘s involvement in 
rejection of the clause, and the events of Paris, were significant in the establishment of the 
Australian nation. She further shows how the nation was formed, in part, by the new status of 
becoming a self- representative Dominion in a new international forum, where matters of 
                                                 
22
 Ibid, pp. 75-94, 163.  
23
 Ibid, pp. 150-7. 
24
 They refer to two works by of E.W. Cole and E.W. Foxall who feared provoking Japan through asserting 
White Australia. Both works were released in 1903: Ibid, p. 161. 
25
 Ibid, p. 159. 
26
 Ibid, pp. 294-5. 
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self-determination, including immigration, were perceived as factors in maintaining national 
sovereignty.
27
 Yet Shimazu also pursues a limited perspective on Hughes‘ particular 
relationship to the White Australia policy to explain Australia‘s actions at the Conference.28 
Furthermore while she does indicate that Hughes‘ ‗intransigence‘ over the episode was not 
universally approved of in Australia, she only relates those opinions that criticised Hughes in 
terms of the belief the he was turning Paris into an ‗electioneering campaign‘. 29 She therefore 
does not give any indication of diversified views in Australia on White Australia or the 
Japanese Australian relationship on which this thesis hopes to expand. 
Apart from these major works there are others which deal either with the progression of the 
racial equality clause at Paris or White Australia as it was formulated at the time. However, 
these are not as comprehensive in specifically analysing Australia‘s role in the episode or the 
deeper ideological framework of the nation. For example Paul Gordon Lauren, while 
devoting a substantial amount of his work to the progression of the racial equality clause,
30
 
focuses very little on what the clause or its denial meant for Australia. In Lauren‘s narrative 
Australia is behind an unabashedly racist Hughes, who Lauren represents as the foreman of a 
racist nation that had a history of racial discrimination, namely towards aboriginals.
31
 
Similarly Seth Tillman, while placing much of the responsibility for the amendments failure 
onto Hughes, refers very little to the implication this it had in Australian public opinion or for 
the ideological structure of White Australia.
32
 In contrast H. I. London represents how White 
Australia developed and evolved throughout the twentieth century as a statement of self-
                                                 
27
 Shimazu, Japan, Race and Equality, pp. 119-22. 
28
 Ibid, pp. 125-35. 
29
 Ibid, p. 133. 
30
 Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination, 2nd Edition, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 82-100. 
31
 Ibid, pp. 90,  92, 94. 
32
 Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961), pp. 300-4. 
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determined nationality,
33
 yet he dedicates little time to the clause mentioning it briefly as an 
issue of domestic sovereignty.
34
  Kenneth Rivett does mention Australia‘s role in blocking 
racial equality as a significant development in Australian identification as a self-determined 
nation. Indeed, even though he downplays its significance, he indicates how this interrelated 
to the continuing debate over White Australia and the relationship with Japan.
35
 Nevertheless, 
he dedicates very little time to the events of Paris or the key figures who contributed to the 
discussion on these issues and specifically, what their motivations were. 
It is evident that while there is scholarship dealing with the proposal‘s rejection and 
Australia‘s role in the rejection, how the event played into this international schema and the 
process of establishing the Australian nation, at least in an ideological sense, has not received 
much attention. Hughes‘ personal prominence as a staunch objector to the proposal often 
takes over the literature dealing with the amendments rejection. This leads some scholars to 
argue that it was by Hughes‘ own will and tenacity that the clause was blocked and that the 
weakness of the other Australian delegates, especially Sir Joseph Cook, meant that Hughes‘ 
voice was the only one that had any substantial effect on Australia‘s actions at the 
conference.
36
 Taking this even further one scholar argues that the responsibility for the clause 
being unsuccessful almost entirely sits on Hughes‘ shoulders.37 In fact in almost all of the 
above works a common theme exists in the literature about whether a casual relation can be 
traced from Hughes‘s actions to the actual blocking of the clause. However, this focus means 
that the true significance of this episode is lost. Indeed whether or not a causal relationship is 
ascertainable it is evident that the clause still had a substantial, sustained and diversified 
                                                 
33
H. I. London, Non-White Immigration and the White Australia Policy (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 
1970), pp. 3-23  
34
Ibid, pp. 14, 205-6. 
35
 Kenneth Rivett, Australia and the Non-White Migrant (Carlton South, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 
1975), pp. 20-2. 
36
 Hudson, Billy Hughes in Paris, pp. 61-4. 
37
 Ibid, p. 57-8; Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations, p. 304.  
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effect on Australian public opinion, especially regarding how the Australia nation came to be 
conceptualised in the early twentieth century.  
This dissertation moves the focus away from finding any causal relationship in the episode 
and strives to address gaps in the historiography over the significance of Australia‘s role in 
blocking the Japanese proposal. There will be a focus on why the clause was rejected in terms 
of developing the nation and, why and how, the Australian public dealt with national issues 
such as diplomacy, defence and labour. In actuality this episode created continued, varied 
discussion in Australia over the idea of the Australian nation, White Australia and the 
problems of the Japanese-Australian relationship, which continued for more than a decade 
after the episode. 
In order to understand the broader range of views on the nation and why the idea of 
defending the nation was so important in the discussion of the racial equality clause, this 
study looks at a wave of Australian opinion which followed the events at Paris. Indeed the 
significance of this episode in Australian national history as this period is evident by how it 
sustained diverse debate for more than a decade after its occurrence. These discussions were 
formulated on the idea of the Australian nation via the issues surrounding Australia‘s 
relationship with Japan, the international community in general, and the issues surrounding 
White Australia.  To synthesise these discussions this thesis focuses on two themes: labour 
and defence, which were both deeply significant aspects in the formation of the Australian 
nation as an international player, which itself is stressed in the first chapter. In fact it is 
argued that the reason why the blocking of the racial clause was so critical was its connection 
to labour and defence, which were political issues particular to each nation and therefore key 
to a nation‘s progress and sovereignty as defined by the new international schema of the 
twentieth century.  
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An active attempt has been undertaken to move the focus of the importance of the episode 
away from Hughes, by placing him as a part in a larger narrative. It is pointed out that many 
opinions existed in Australia on these issues; some that supported Hughes‘ rhetoric on Japan, 
White Australia and the nation and others that deeply conflicted with his assertions. To show 
this an effort has been made to gauge the diversity of public opinion by a selected survey of 
public media and the opinions of public figures, just proceeding, at the time of and in the 
decade after, the events of Paris. This includes a broad range of articles and reports from 
leading Australian and imperial newspapers and periodicals of the period, ranging from state 
newspapers such as The Sydney Morning Herald and The Argus, to scholarly journals such as 
The Round Table. Furthermore evidence will be presented that several groups perceived 
problems with a hard-line view of White Australia, as a threat to establishing a progressive 
and sovereign nation, such as: internationalists, academics, tropical medicine scientists and 
prominent members of the religious community among others. To gain a clear perspective on 
these groups‘ views, their specific journal articles and books have been sourced where it is 
clear that their opinions diverged from the conceptualisation of White Australia and Japan 
held by figures, such as Hughes. In fact through an analysis of their papers it is evident that 
even those closest to the decision making, including members of the Australian delegation 
and key public service figures, had divergent views in regards to the racial equality clause. 
These figures, despite their advocating of a White Australia, recognised the complexity of the 
issues that surrounded the clause and therefore doubted Hughes‘ method in dealing with the 
Japanese proposal.  
In order to fully encompass the breath of these issues this dissertation is divided into three 
chapters. The first chapter deals with the sequence of events that led to rejection of the clause 
and the legacy this episode created for Hughes and for Australia as a nation. It will present 
how Australian commentators recognised a change to Australia‘s national statue by its 
16 | P a g e  
 
participation in Paris and therefore questions arose about the responsibilities such 
independence gave. This, it is demonstrated, led to discussions over how a controversial 
policy, such as White Australia, should be explained or even modified, especially since it 
conflicted with another important aspect of securing the nation: Australia‘s tenuous 
relationship with Japan. The episode of the racial equality proposal, and especially Hughes‘ 
diplomatic method, was a key factor in understanding Australian identity as an international 
participant and hence inspired a sustained debate. The second chapter expands on how labour 
and economic conditions were understood as factors in establishing the nation and were 
greatly discussed in regard to the clauses failure and White Australia. Here a tension can be 
seen between those who believed that white Australian labour and the economy could only be 
preserved if degenerate coloured labour was excluded, and those who believed that White 
Australia jeopardised economic progress and was becoming irrelevant due to the proven 
ability of Asian peoples. Similarly, the third and final chapter examines how defence was a 
key part of developing the Australian nation. Here it is demonstrated how argument arose 
about how to secure the nation‘s defence given the conflicting opinions that existed over 
whether White Australia was the best means to guarantee national security since it may have 
insulted in the growing national power of Japan. 
 
 
 
 
 Chapter One: Hughes, Nation and Legacy   
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Australia‘s participation in the Versailles Peace Conference was to become an affair of great 
significance in realising Australia‘s status as a nation. As Australia‘s wartime Prime Minister, 
Hughes undeniably played a large part in these proceedings. Indeed it is not an 
understatement that a historical legacy was created at Paris for both the Australian nation and 
Hughes as its supposed defender and champion. This chapter develops not only how this 
legacy was created in reaction to the clause, by pre-setting a history of the episode, but also 
how it was part of the new international framework that the Conference had spurred. 
However, evidence is presented that the events became the subject of debate with varied 
Australian opinions, which differed from Hughes and even criticised the legacy of his 
diplomatic method. Nevertheless these sources also show that despite advocating different 
views serving the nation was almost always the primary concern. 
Preparing Australia for Paris 
Even before the war officially ended Hughes considered the settlement of peace with 
Germany as a question of great national importance. At the Imperial War Cabinet of 1918 in 
London he was scathing in his attack of the Imperial government for what he perceived as a 
lack of proper consultation with the Dominions. Most specifically he criticised the adoption 
of President Wilson‘s Fourteen Points as the basis of the peace discussions.38 Hughes 
believed that Wilson‘s points conflicted with Australia‘s interests regarding annexation of the 
Pacific ex-German colonies and therefore establishing a defence against Japan.
39
  Even at this 
early stage it was clear that, at least in Hughes‘ criticisms, the self-governing Dominions 
                                                 
38
 Meaney, Australia and World Crisis, pp. 290-300. 
39
 Hughes had in fact profoundly distrusted Japan‘s occupation of any Pacific islands and stressed to Lloyd 
George that the Pacific islands were a crucial aspect of Australia defence: Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger, pp.  
347-349;  For Hughes criticism of the Fourteen Points see Ibid, pp. 354- 55. 
18 | P a g e  
 
were no longer passive bystanders in international affairs, especially if such international 
circumstances involved national interests.  
However, it is also evident that Hughes‘ criticisms were not wholly endorsed by the Australia 
public. The Melbourne Argus pointed out that Hughes, in language that was by no means 
‗gracious‘, had been unable to cool off his warlike temper and was unrepresentative of 
Australia when he launched his attack on Britain. Australians, the article pointed out, had 
been quite satisfied with the way the Armistice had been conducted and had not expected to 
be informed on its proceedings, since the Empire was trusted to secure Australia‘s interests. 
Hughes was therefore charged as being disloyal, in causing a breakdown of the Empire.
40
 
In November of 1918 the Australian press reported that an American source had revealed the 
seven main proposals Japan would advocate at the settlement of peace. The seventh proposal 
was that Japan would receive ‗reciprocatory rights‘ for its citizens ‗throughout the world‘. 
These Australian newspapers quickly linked this with immigration and White Australia. One 
article, which simply listed the points, was subtitled as ‗Free Entry into All Countries‘ while 
another directly stated that White Australia, a very ‗desirable policy‘ to most Australians, was 
brought ‗into question at once‘ by the proposal.  However already divergences in opinion are 
evident since this second article concluded that the Japanese were most likely not seeking to 
claim right to Australia‘s empty territory and therefore the proposal should be accepted as an 
act of friendship.
41
   
It is evident that Hughes also perceived this connection to the issues of White Australia, 
immigration and, therefore, Australian nationalism, yet he viewed such developments with a 
sense of dread. At a luncheon, before the conference, presented by the Australia and New 
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Zealand Luncheon Club, Hughes made a speech where he prophesised that the domestic 
policies of Australia, such as White Australia, could be challenged at the Conference. Hughes 
expressed that he was determined to make sure that, what Australia had gone into the war 
with would be maintained after the war.
42
  Indeed just before the first plenary session he 
stated that reparations, the fate of the ex-German Pacific islands and the allowance of 
‗promiscuous immigration‘ by the League were issues where Australian interests were 
inescapably bound.
43
  Furthermore after the conference he commented at the A.I.F and War 
Chest Club that he had always expected that White Australia would have to be defended and 
that some nation would probably ‗endeavour to wrest if from [Australia].‘44 
Racial Equality Proposed: Hughes the Australian “Stumbling Block” 
The racial equality proposal was formulated by the Japanese government under Prime 
Minister Hara Takeshi. Shimazu establishes how the Hara government had taken a positive 
stance in relation to the West and the new international order of the League. This she argues 
prompted discussion on racial equality since it had been included as a compromise to 
convince the Diplomatic Advisory Council to support Japan‘s involvement in the League. 
Members of the DAC had been sceptical of the League as a Western institution and therefore 
wanted a guarantee that racial prejudice against the Japanese would not be systemic in it.
45
   
However, it was only at the proceedings of the Peace conference, staring in early 1919, that 
the racial equality proposal as a matter of international controversy was fully realised. It is 
evident that throughout the events of Versailles conference the Australian delegation, with 
Hughes at the forefront, was a major force that stood against its passing. As Fitzhardinge, and 
even Hughes‘ himself, pointed out, at its first stages the Japanese proposal was welcomed by 
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the major powers, and most importantly the United States.  Colonel House‘s positive 
feedback on the proposal had encouraged the Japanese delegates and had given them hope 
that the amendment could be accepted by the League.
46
  Therefore, when the proposal was 
first suggested on the 13
th
 of February as an amendment to Article 21, an article that proposed 
to secure religious freedom, the Japanese were surprised to find that it was not accepted. Sir 
Robert Cecil, delegate of the British Empire, who held the position of chairman in this 
session, postponed the decision making on the clause stating that it was an issue of great 
importance and controversy for the British Dominions.
47
 As Hudson notes, while the proposal 
had progressed, in terms of convincing the Americans, the Dominions negative stance and the 
‗intransigence‘ of Hughes meant that the British delegation stood as the main opponent of the 
proposal.
48
 
Indeed as House indicated, the Australian delegation came to be the ‗stumbling block‘ to the 
Japanese ambitions.
49
 The Japanese delegates had the greatest struggle over the racial 
equality with Hughes himself simply because he was unmovable on the issue.
50
 Shimazu 
exemplifies Hughes defiance by referring to how he would not change his position despite 
Japanese attempts to reword the clause so that it was not perceived as a declaration of 
unrestricted immigration. Even when the rest of the Dominions came to support the clause 
after rewording, Hughes would not budge from his position and defiantly left the meeting 
between the Empire and Japan where the rewording had been proposed.
51
  
At only one point did Hughes show any willingness to negotiate, stating that he would accept 
the clause if it contained an amendment that immigration was a domestic issue. The South 
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African delegate Jan Smuts, who the Japanese tried to  convince to persuade Hughes to 
accept the clause, conveyed on 31
st
 of March that Hughes might accept the proposal if it 
guaranteed no right to enter Australia.  
 
The Japanese in turn rejected this stating that it had 
taken Japan years to remove such an immigration clause from a commercial treaty with the 
United States.
 52
 In reflection Major Piesse, as a consistent critic of Hughes‘ treatment of the 
Japanese, attributed this refusal to the fact that excluding immigration would have angered 
the Japanese public and may have even jeopardised the lives of the delegates.
53
 Indeed 
Hughes recorded in his memoirs that Japanese delegate Baron Makino had emphasised that if 
he went back to Japan, without the acceptance of racial equality, he would be killed by the 
Japanese people.
54
 Nevertheless the Australian delegation took Japan‘s unwillingness to 
concede an amendment to the clause as further evidence that it was the intention of the 
Japanese to break down immigration restrictions.
55
 Indeed both Sir John Latham, the personal 
secretary of Australia delegate Joseph Cook and Percy Deane, Hughes personal secretary, 
stated that it was because the Japanese had not conceded that Hughes was right in 
maintaining his opposition.
56
  
However it not often stressed how some completely rejected this point, with Hughes 
receiving criticism, even from members of the Australian delegation. Administrative member 
of Hughes‘ staff, Frederic Eggleston who, it will be shown stood adamantly for a White 
Australia, nevertheless believed that Hughes had not dealt with the situation correctly. 
Eggleston, who favoured Wilsonian diplomacy, believed that Hughes had acted with a lack of 
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tact in the proceeding of Paris.
57
 Evidence shows that Eggleston even doubted whether 
Hughes would have conceded even if the Japanese had amended the clause to state it was not 
about immigration. In a letter to Fitzhardinge,
58
 written after Hughes‘ passing, Eggleston 
wished to point out that Robert Garran, another Australian delegate, had made errors in 
recording Hughes‘ actions at Paris. He rejected Garran‘s claim that Hughes would have 
accepted the clause given an immigration amendment. Indeed Eggleston speculated that this 
was only what Hughes had told his staff and in fact although Hughes may have mentioned a 
concession it all ‗depended on what was actually said and the way in which it was put.‘  
Furthermore he attested that Hughes probably ‗had his mind on his enemies in Australia and 
was against any admission whatever, because it would be criticised.‘ Eggleston claimed he 
had pushed for Hughes to add an amendment relating to immigration to the covenant but that 
Hughes had been too ‗afraid to touch it‘ and that in the end it was Wilson who had ‗served 
Hughes‘ by rejecting the clause.59 Therefore Eggleston‘s comments reflect how those 
surrounding Hughes doubted his unmoving position and despite being in favour of a White 
Australia personally viewed the best solution in a completely different light.  
Racial Equality Rejected 
On the 11
th
 of April the Japanese, as represented by Baron Makino, once again brought forth 
the issue of the racial equality clause. Here Makino argued that the institution of the League, 
which had presented itself as a new court of justice in international affairs, had given nations 
legitimate aspirations to correct what they saw as injustices of the world. It was via this new 
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international framework, where the idea of nationality stood at the core that Makino hoped to 
justify Japan‘s claims: 
‗The sentiment of nationality, one of the strongest human feelings, has been aroused by the present 
world-wide moral renaissance, and is at present receiving just recognition in adjusting international 
affairs. In close connection with the grievances of the oppressed nationalities, there exists the wrongs 
of racial discrimination which was, and is, the subject of deep resentment to a large portion of the 
human race. The feeling of being slighted has long been a standing grievance with certain peoples. 
And the announcement of the principle of justice for peoples and nationalities as the basis of future 
international relationships has so heightened their legitimate aspirations that they consider it their right 
that this wrong be redressed.‘
60
   
The delegates of the other nations were hard pressed to validate the rejection of the clause. 
Cecil, who it must be remembered represented Australia as the representative of the empire,
61
 
was noted by David Miller, a legal adviser to the American delegation, to have seemed 
‗agitated‘ and ‗embarrassed‘ when arguing against the clause.62 Indeed Cecil conceded that 
he ‗regretted that he was not in a position to vote for the amendment although he was 
personally in accord with the idea advanced by the Japanese delegation‘  but that the clause 
had to be rejected since the commission would encroach ‗upon the sovereignty of States 
Members of the League‘ if it found in favour. Cecil argued that either the clause was not 
practical, and therefore ineffective, or it was practical and therefore be controversial as it 
could be seen that the clause would enable the League to interfere in issues of domestic 
sovereignty. Japanese delegate Viscount Chinda, who clearly recognised that the objection 
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was based on the controversy over immigration and the Dominions, responded that Japan had 
not approached the question of race or immigration and it ‗asked for nothing more than the 
principle of the equality of nations‘.63 
The Japanese therefore asked that a vote should be taken on the inclusion of the amendment. 
The result was eleven votes in favour out of a possible seventeen. However, at this point 
President Wilson, as chairman, indicated that the amendment had not been adopted given it 
had not received a unanimous vote. This decision was both controversial and significant as it 
meant that the United States did not have to openly reject the clause.
64
 In fact when a member 
of the French delegation pointed out that the vote had the majority Wilson replied that this 
did not matter, it needed unanimous support, and that the only decision taken by the League 
that did not, determining the seat of league, was a special exception.
65
   
The general consensus of scholars is that Hughes‘ threat to raise the race issue in the west of 
the United States and most importantly California, where anti-Japanese sentiment was rife, 
must have had some effect on Wilson‘s decision. According to House, Hughes had planned to 
‗make a speech at the Plenary Conference and to raise a storm of protest not only in the 
Dominions but in the Western part of the United States‘66. Wilson had no choice but to veto 
the amendment or have Hughes stir up the anti-Asiatic sentiment in California which would 
cause problems in his administration. These arguments are usually accompanied by a 
reflection on the possible insincerity in the US and Wilson‘s support for the Japanese 
amendment in the first place.  Here Wilson‘s commitment to white superiority and the fact 
that prominent Americans were happy to put the responsibility of the rejection onto Australia 
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in order to avoid directly confronting the Japanese is often stressed.
67
 Hughes also related that 
this was the case in that when he heard of the amendment he was shocked to find that the 
United States was somewhat impartial to it. He recounts how he called a press conference , 
telling US journalists to report to the Pacific states to ‗protest against this evil, this wicked 
clause…overwhelm the president with messages imploring, demanding, that it be 
withdrawn.‘68 Clearly, however, the focus on this casual relationship has tended to narrow the 
breadth of Australian opinion behind Hughes, with historians judging the event‘s significance 
by Australia‘s impact on the clause and almost never the other way around. 
 
Hughes in Paris: A Legacy 
Indeed the vote on the 11
th
 is where most histories place the conclusion of the racial equality 
clause with brief mentions of the immediate reaction.
69
While Makino clearly stated that the 
Japanese would bring the issue up again at the next meeting of the League in 1920 at Geneva, 
the Japanese delegate stressed at that conference stated that while the question was still 
important, Japan would choose not to pursue it.
70
 However, Meaney makes a persuasive point 
that the ability of the Japanese to bring these issues up again meant that the question was still 
very much a prevalent issue. He stresses that at least for Hughes, and his post-war world view 
where he viewed the Conference‘s conclusion as ‗not a good peace‘, discussions over racial 
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equality were not seen as being over.
71
 Indeed evidence demonstrates that contemporaries, 
beyond Hughes, recognised this as the case and therefore contributed to the ongoing 
discussion of the episode in Australia.
72
 
When Hughes set out to return from his long absence at Paris he was received with an 
overwhelming positive response by Australians. The London Times reported how Hughes 
was greeted by rousing cheers and carried on the shoulders of Australian diggers when he 
visited the AIF and War Chest Club in London at the conclusion of the Conference.
73
 
Similarly the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Hughes had been warmly received at 
Perth, Melbourne and Adelaide and that Sydney would be no different. It was claimed that 
the Hughes had achieved a ‗triumphal progress‘ unprecedented by an Australian leader and 
that the ‗demonstrative enthusiasm‘ he received was ‗recognition of the fact that he has 
deserved well of Australia‘.74   
Meaney argues that the resolution of the Peace at Paris was ‗Absolutely Unbearable‘ for 
Hughes. He attests that Hughes‘ vision for the post-settlement of a Pax Britannica was 
defeated. Meaney points out that Hughes had lost on all of his main fronts: Australia did not 
receive reparations, was only given a mandate over New Guinea when Hughes had pushed 
for annexation and the question of racial equality could be brought up by the Japanese 
again.
75
 Yet it is evident that despite these apparent failures Hughes, on his return to Australia, 
adopted the mantle of a great victor and, most importantly, a great champion of White 
Australia. At the AIF and War Chest Club ‗digger‘s lunch‘, Hughes attested that he had 
guaranteed Australia‘s national safety by his actions in preserving White Australia; Despite 
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the great ‗condemnation‘ he had received for defending the ‗great heritage‘ of White 
Australia he had, nevertheless, ‗stood up for Australia in the face of all opposition: he had set 
out to represent Australia, and he had done it.‘76 
 At the Parliamentary session where the Commonwealth government was to ratify the peace 
agreement, Hughes emphasised how the Australian delegation had served as White 
Australia‘s champions. He displayed the struggle as a David and Goliath battle: a small 
nation of only 5,000,000 versus an overwhelming assembly of Asiatic peoples where the 
victory of White Australia was ‗the greatest thing which [Australia had] achieved‘. While 
Australian soldiers had fought in the war for liberty and therefore the right to a White 
Australia, Hughes claimed that he and Cook had ‗brought that great principle back from the 
Conference‘ and that it was now safely in the hands of Australians:  
‗White Australia is yours. You may do with it as you please… Here it is, at least as safe as it was on 
the day when it was first adopted by this parliament.‘  
Hughes believed by obtaining a lack of racial mixing Australia proved it was willing to 
preserve its destiny of holding the continent for white Australians as a matter of liberty. 77  
However, while this speech has been noted in histories of the episode,
78
 two important points 
from it have been neglected that show how Hughes himself must have recognised that White 
Australia, especially in regards to the Japanese amendment, was politically complicated and 
at least required clarification. The first point is that Hughes conceded there were those in 
Australia who objected to the idea of a White Australia. Hughes limited these to the ‗two 
extremes poles of political opinion‘ but still feared them enough to have expressed how 
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fortunate it was that their numbers and influence were ‗insignificant‘.79 The second point is 
that, despite the principle of a White Australia having already been fought for Hughes found 
it necessary to clear up all ‗misunderstandings‘ so that Australia‘s ‗friends and allies‘ would 
not ‗misconceive‘ the actions taken by the Australia delegation at Paris. He stressed that 
Japan was recognised as a an equal and that White Australia was simply a declaration of the 
right and the liberty of a sovereign nation to choose which people make up its populace, not a 
claim of superiority. Therefore, he hoped that Australia and Japan would continue to be allies, 
remaining ‗forever on terms of the most perfect friendship.‘80 While this could simply be 
regarded as political expediency it shows some recognition from Hughes that Japan could 
have been offended by his vigorous defending of the White Australia doctrine. Hence it 
required him to officially state that, in order to guarantee that Japan would not become hostile, 
that he, and by inference Australia, still hoped to maintain friendly relations with Japan. 
Indeed it is clear that the idea of preserving the nation was paramount throughout the events 
of Paris, whether by direct endorsement of White Australia or not. 
 
Formulating the Nation: Australia and the New International order 
Why these events and actions established as a legacy of nationhood can be explained by how 
they occurred within the development of the new international and transnational framework 
of the early twentieth century, namely the League of Nations. The League marked a new 
development in global affairs and reformed how the ‗nation‘ itself was defined. It was the 
brainchild President Wilson and was designed as part of the peace settlement that 
institutionalised international affairs. It was to create a community of nation states utilising 
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diplomacy to resolve conflict and prevent future world wars.
81
 In this schema it was hoped 
that ―world interest‖ would win over the interests of individual nations and hence peace for 
all could be maintained.
82
 However, the League and the proceedings at the Peace Conference 
were heavily influenced by the doctrine of self-determinism: that a state had the right to 
political independence in the pursuit of becoming a progressive, and hopefully democratic, 
nation. In fact Wilson‘s Fourteen Points, the ideas Wilson believed should guide the League, 
were heavily influenced by the ideal of self-determinism. For example point fourteen stated 
that ‗A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the 
purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to 
great and small states alike‘. This meant that the League was dependent on the nation and its 
rights as the foundation of the League was a community of nations which were units defined 
as sovereign and progressive.
83
  
This institutionalised, new, international world order was of great interest in Australian 
circles since it gave a new international status to nations including those in their early 
development, such as Australia. The League attracted critics in Australia, most notable 
Hughes, who saw it as a threat to sovereignty in that it might jeopardise the integrity of the 
British Empire.
84
 In fact Hughes stated to the America press in the midst of the Paris 
discussions that ‗Australia cannot accept a proposal that strikes at the root of a policy [White 
Australia] we have long maintained and which is vital to our existence‘ and that the clause 
was dangerous as ‗no matter how innocuous it seems in form, [it] is certainly aimed at giving 
the League control of questions relating to immigration‘.85  However, for others, such as the 
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League of Nations Union and Anglican Bishop George Long of Bathurst, the League was the 
greatest guarantor of sovereignty and peace and should be trusted.
86
 
In fact the following examples of contemporaries‘ opinions demonstrate that while many 
Australians conceptualised the importance of the denial of racial equality and nation to the 
same degree as Hughes their assertions were evidently far removed from his. Indeed these 
examples show that even though many clearly recognised White Australia as pivotal to 
nationhood, it was also often conditioned on certain factors of the nation like labour and 
defence. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Hughes‘ diplomatic method was questioned 
by these individuals as it did not seem to fully account for complex circumstances of the 
episode like Australia‘s new international status or the position of Japan as a growing power. 
One clear example of an opinion, which was divergent from Hughes, but still adamantly 
supported White Australia and the nation, is that of Latham who, as a delegate to Paris, 
believed in the advantages of the League and its diplomatic trappings unlike Hughes. After 
the Conference Latham produced a pamphlet entitled The Significance of the Peace 
Conference from an Australian point of view, where he summed up his views of the events. 
Latham argued that the Conference was very significant as it was an indication that Australia 
had ‗won nationhood‘. Australians, he pointed out, would have to recognise that Australia‘s 
ability to participate in the peace had been more than an ‗international compliment‘. In this he 
explained that nationhood ‗brings responsibilities, duties and risks, as well as benefits and 
advantages.‘87 He argued that the preservation of White Australia was a matter of sovereignty 
and progress as the ‗possibility of a continued white democracy‘ was inexorably linked to it. 
For Latham it was the ‗right of every self-governing community to determine the ingredients 
                                                 
86
 For idea that the league was the best machinery for peace see Sir Henry Braddon, ‗The League of Nations 
Speech‘ delivered at a Meeting of The English Speaking Union, (Sydney, October 1924); For ideas that 
Australia should support the league see ‗Bishop Disappointed with Australia‘, Sydney Morning Herald, 22 July 
1919. 
87
 Latham, The Significance of the Peace Conference, p. 3. 
31 | P a g e  
 
of its own population‘ and ‗If that right is surrendered, self-government disappears.‘88 He 
also linked this to this issue of defence in that if the ―open door‖ had applied to the South 
Pacific islands, they would be taken over by ‗alien immigrants‘ placing White Australia and 
Australia in general, in a dangerous position; Latham believed that ‗a friend today may be a 
foe tomorrow‘.89  
However, while Latham had agreed with the reasoning to reject the clause to prevent any 
threat to White Australia it is evident that he thought that certain methods of affirmation, as 
given by people like Hughes, were counterproductive.  Firstly Latham, unlike Hughes, 
believed that the League was very effective in guaranteeing Australia‘s defence and 
sovereign rights. He indicated that Australians should trust in the League referring 
specifically to clause 10 of the Covenant, where it is indicated that ‗existing political 
independence‘ will be upheld so that a policy like White Australia, which he argued was part 
of Australian independence, would not be infringed. Furthermore Latham was in complete 
opposition to Hughes‘ striving for annexation of the South, ex-German, Pacific islands as a 
defence measure. Such a result, Latham pointed out, would have been ‗disastrous‘ and would 
have jeopardised Australian defence by allowing Japan to annex the North, ex-German, 
Pacific islands and build bases there. 
90
 In fact in a letter of thanks to Professor Alfred 
Zimmern, a noted English historian and internationalist, for a positive review Zimmern gave 
of his work, Latham expressed that due to the position of confidence he had developed with 
Australian ministers he had not been able to be completely honest about Hughes. Hughes, 
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Latham related, was a ‗good specimen of a forceful person who had learnt hardly anything 
from the debacle of the past six years‘.91  
Indeed in his pamphlet Latham realised how malleable White Australia was and even found it 
necessary to set out a clarification of the ideal. Here he stressed that White Australia must be 
expressed in considered terms and that some forms of affirmation were complicated by the 
propensity to insult another nation, like Japan:  
 ‗It must be remembered that there are various methods of expressing a policy, and various means of 
applying a principle. It also should not be forgotten that the principle underlying a policy is frequently 
misunderstood in foreign countries. It is vitally important for Australia to understand her White 
Australia policy – to get at the root of it and view it in all aspects. When the policy is so considered, it 
will be found that it contains nothing that can justly be regarded as offensive by any foreign nation.‘
92
 
Similarly the Round Table: a popular imperial journal, also expressed both how the events in 
regards to the Japanese clause, were important as they related to the foundation of the 
Australian nation but also how Hughes‘ affirmation of White Australia was, at times, 
detrimental to the nation.  Although a series of articles were published in regards to 
Australian actions in Paris as the Conference was taking place,
93
 the most pertinent example 
relating to the racial equality episode was written the following year.
94
 The article written by 
‗an Australian pen‘ was self-identified as a work which made ‗an attempt to present the case 
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for a White Australia‘.95 The article pointed out that the White Australia policy was as much 
the national foundation of Australia as the Monroe Doctrine was of the United states  or the 
policy of maintaining sea power was of the British; White Australia was ‗the first exercise of 
[an Australian] national consciousness.‘96 It indicated that two major factors for the 
establishment, and justification, of a White Australia on national grounds, were its usefulness 
in terms of Australian security and Australian economic standards. In regards to the former 
the article indicated that by maintaining racial purity Australia had managed to avoid any 
racial conflicts which were a threat to democracy
97
. Likewise it was suggested that White 
Australia played a pivotal role in protecting labour and economic standards, blocking of 
cheap coloured labour to prevent it becoming exploited, like slaves, for capitalistic profit. 
98
 
The racial equality clause, which the author pointed out, had no written guarantee that it 
would not be used to challenge White Australia,
99
 therefore threatened a crucial aspect of 
Australia‘s national foundation. 
Indeed the writer conceded that the White Australia policy‘s status as a legitimate national 
aspiration was exactly why there was complication and controversy about the racial equality 
clause. The recognition of White Australia it argued also was the recognition that the need to 
relieve excess population was in the ‗legitimate scope‘ of Eastern nations.  Therefore, the 
idea that White Australia was simply a denial of this right had caused resentment in other 
nations like Japan. However, the author also claimed that such contentions could be resolved, 
in that if the liberty to decide the population of one‘s nation was recognised by the 
international community, no country could claim damage to its ‗amour propre’. Indeed the 
article went on to argue that Hughes‘ resolve to fight the clause instead of affirming the right 
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to choose one‘s population was a diplomatic mistake. In concluding it was stated that 
Australia had to undertake certain tasks if it was to justify White Australia. Firstly, 
immigration would need to be dealt with through a constructive program where large portions 
of land could be effectively settled. Secondly, Australia could no longer rely on appeals to 
‗crude nationalism‘ that came with a lack of diplomatic experience. The writer argued that by 
not taking a considered approach Australia harmed itself and the Empire by provoking 
foreign nations.
100
  
Similarly, in her 1923 work the History of the White Australia policy to 1920 Myra Willard 
recognised the clause‘s rejection in terms of defending Australia‘s wish to become a 
sovereign nation. Willard argued that White Australia received ‗validity‘ and ‗morality‘ 
through the recognition of Australia‘s right to become a self-realised nation. She pointed out 
that the right of nation to preserve its identity was fast becoming an internationally accepted 
ideal of the rise of independent nations. Willard attested that Australia‘s racial purity was 
therefore an attempt at forming a progressive nation; White Australia was an escape from the 
old world history of racial conflict and promoted self-realisation of a nation by unity of 
race.
101
 However, Willard conditioned the success of a White Australia on how effectively 
Australia was populated with suitable white immigration to help develop those areas that 
Australia had not yet been able to. A lack of planned immigration, she pointed out, portrayed 
Australia as greedy and a White Australia as simply a ‗Dog in the Manger‘ policy.102  
 According to Willard the general support the Japanese received from the other nations, 
simply increased the threat to Australia. These countries, she attests, were already well 
established nations and hence did not share Australia‘s vulnerable position where it was 
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necessary to justify White Australia‘s validity.  Referring to an unsourced quote Willard 
maintained that Australia‘s claim ‗to the right of self-realisation‘ depended on it fulfilling its 
‗duties‘ to develop and extract its resources to meet the demand of the world. Australia‘s 
‗willingness and ability‘ had to be up to par or else Australia would be unable to keep ‗her 
right to retain her identity‘.103  
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The legacy of national importance that the events of the Peace Conference had for Australia 
make it evident that discussion over the nation was themed on issues which were seen as 
essential to national stability. This chapter will demonstrate how guaranteeing a democratic 
and effective standard of labour was one such theme and was a main factor behind the 
establishment of the White Australia policy. It presents how the current historiography has 
demonstrated that the Japanese proposal for racial equality had been equated with an attack 
on White Australia because it was believed it would allow lower class Asiatic workers to 
enter Australia, subsequently downgrading labour conditions. Indeed the opinions of those 
Australians are soured to show not only how they believed that this was exactly what White 
Australia was meant to prevent, but also the arguments they used to justify such an opinion. 
However, this dissertation expands on this by demonstrating that discussion was sustained 
over racial equality and will contrast these affirmations to Australian voices that doubted 
White Australia was an effective way to guarantee labour standards. These Australian argued 
that by denying racial equality, when evidence suggested the coloured labour were more 
effective workers than a white, Australia was enabling a dangerous ―Dog in the Manger‖ 
policy to form. 
 
White Australia: the guarantor of labour standards 
The platform that White Australia was built on was that it beneficial to maintaining good 
labour conditions. Lake and Reynolds show how White Australia developed out a doctrine of 
‗Whiteness‘. ‗Whiteness‘ and race purity, they argue, was a framework for the virtuous 
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aspects of Australian life and nationality.
104
 When it comes to the significance of labour they 
refer to Justice H. B. Higgins‘ Harvest Judgement in that a man‘s wage was to be ‗fair and 
reasonable‘ and the interests of the employee were placed before the employer as the 
cornerstone of White Australia. They point out that what Higgins viewed as a ‗fair and 
reasonable‘ wage as the amount it would take for a white man to take care of a family with 
three children.  Therefore, they argue that Asiatics, who were often single men, were seen as 
cheap labourers in Higgins‘ schema as they only supported themselves and their lower living 
standards.
105
  
Supporting this Willard also had expressed that the development of the policy was bound to 
progress in labour standards. She tracked the policy from its origins in the individual states 
through their indentured labour experiments, the influx of Chinese workers and the system of 
Kanaka labour in Queensland. These, she pointed out, were all failures which led to racial 
conflict where white labourers feared that they would be undersold by coloured labour. For 
example, with the influx of Chinese workers at the time of the gold rushes, Willard indicated 
that calls for exclusionist policy became prevalent due to the resentment felt by whites in that 
the Chinese worked longer hours and sent their profits overseas.
106
 Unions and workers, she 
points out, feared that the competition from these labourers would jeopardize ‗industrial 
democracy‘ as they would be ‗cheap‘ and ‗uncontrolled‘.107 
Compounding this was the idea that a system of coloured labour would degenerate 
democracy due to the unscrupulous Whites who would exploit them. The most striking 
example she gave was that of the Kanaka, indentured labour system where, she attested a 
relationship of exploitation had formed. Here Pacific workers were not only mistreated but 
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also brought to Australia with little or no consideration of their rights, for the sake of cheap 
labour.
108
 Willard attested that the fear of this undemocratic circumstance impacted on the 
creation and maintenance of White Australia.
109
 Linking these issues directly with the events 
of the Conference Hudson makes a persuasive argument that White Australia at Versailles 
was still tied up with this these fears of exploitation and economic competition. He argues 
that an explanation for Hughes‘ actions at Paris was the fear many Australians had that cheap 
and competitive coloured labour would be abused by some whites for capitalistic enterprise 
to the detriment of the white labourer, if White Australia was abolished. Hudson points out 
that this circumstance was seen as damaging to the liberal, democratic conditions of 
Australia.
110
  
Certainly evidence that prominent Australians believed this to be the case is gained by an 
analysis of the attitude of Australian delegate, Frederic Eggleston. Eggleston in an article to 
the New Statesmen, a British periodical, wrote on this very concern. Here he attempted to 
justify the White Australia policy as he believed that his British counterparts had 
misunderstood it as contrary to the ideals of liberalism. Eggleston explained that, in Australia, 
it was believed that an influx of coloured workers could only lead to a system of indentured 
labour. He argued that the White Australia policy maintained labour standards by stopping 
exploitation of coloured labour by capitalist whites. Indeed, he believed coloured labour 
inherently undersold itself so that when an inferior coloured race mixed with a dominant 
white one, a slave and master dynamic would form and ultimately result in degradation, both 
economically and morally. Hence, Eggleston claimed, that a system of unrestricted 
immigration, as apparent in the Japanese proposal, was detrimental more for the White or 
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dominant power and that creating a nation with a lack of morality and democracy was what 
Australians feared. 
111
 
In a memo entitled the Australia and the Colour Bar Eggleston once again made this point 
giving particular reference to the Japanese amendment at Paris and the negative British press 
which Australia‘s actions had provoked.112 As with the Statesmen article Eggleston argued 
that the White Australia policy was misunderstood in British circles as simply ‗narrow race 
hereditary‘ prejudice.  That with the mass immigration of an Asiatic race, such as the 
Japanese, the industrial conditions of Australia would be dominated by a system of exploited 
coloured labour. He argued it was inevitable that Asiatics, including the Japanese, gave 
themselves ‗a very much lower value than the Anglo-Saxon‘ by a much lower real wage.113 
Even those who had not embraced the results of Hughes‘ actions for Australia at the Peace 
Conference still agreed on the benefits of the White Australia policy for its ability to maintain 
labour standards. For example, Piesse, who is noted by Meaney as being a strong critic of 
Hughes and his actions at Versailles, conceded in this point.
114
 A clear example of this is 
found in a response by Piesse to criticisms levelled at his department by Senator Millen, the 
representative for Australia at the League‘s Geneva conference of 1920. In a radio interview 
Millen charged Piesse‘s department with attempting to make recommendations that would 
degrade White Australia. Piesse responded by arguing that no such recommendations were 
printed anywhere in the department. However Piesse view obviously diverged from some 
government officials as he conceded that there were, and that he agreed with, typed 
recommendations, including changing existing policy so that educated Japanese and Indians 
(students, merchants etc) did not have to apply annually to remain in Australia. However, he 
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maintained that these did not constitute a ‗whittling away of existing restrictions as would 
result in complete abandonment of the White Australia policy‘ as Millen had suggested. 
 Piesse added that, along with any ‗good Australian‘, he had ‗no shadow of a doubt that 
White Australia must be maintained.‘ He noted that White Australia was seen to have two 
functions, important to Australia: to prevent the economic competition of coloured peoples, 
thereby protecting Australian workers and to prevent the mixing of different races which 
could cause race conflict. He argued that in the first point Australia should have no trouble as 
many other nations had enforced a similar policy. In fact he stressed that the most notable 
example was Australia‘s ‗principal opponent, Japan‘ arguing that Japan ‗can have nothing to 
say to restrictions on economic grounds so long as she herself maintains similar 
restrictions.‘115 Hence it is that even those most critical of Hughes and his actions in regards 
to the Japanese proposal still believed in the merits of White Australia system for retaining 
labour standards. Nevertheless it is also evident that despite this belief, Piesse still 
conceptualised what the policy was in a very different manner to the man whom the Hughes‘ 
government had chosen to represent Australia at the 1920 League conference. 
“Unequal in labour” 
A common opinion expressed on the episode was that while the Japanese were not inferior to 
Australian whites in terms of race they were inferior in regards to their labour standards. 
Hughes stressed this view when he tried to justify to the Japanese press Australia‘s negative 
position in regards to the clause.  He pointed out that while ‗Australia freely admits Japan‘s 
equality with herself as a nation‘ and that ‗we can and do admit Japan and the Japanese to be 
our equals before the bar of nations of the world‘  it was also true that ‗Australia and Japan 
do not enjoy equal industrial conditions.‘ In this Hughes referred to Japan‘s position at the 
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international Labour Convention of the peace conference. He indicated that a clause had been 
inserted in the covenant that less developed countries, such as Japan, were exempt from 
paying the same wages or having the same maximum hours, in comparison to nations like 
Australia. Therefore, since the clause ‗would or might affect the industrial development of 
our country [Australia]‘, Hughes argued that it could not be accepted.116 
Hughes statements were not without precedent either. At the Conference‘s conventions on 
labour issues and the establishment of the International Labour Organisation, the Japanese 
had indeed stated that the labour clauses the convention wished to impose could not be 
accepted in Japan without amendment. The Japanese delegate Mr. Oka Minoru argued that 
Japan was at an earlier industrial stage then the advanced Western nations. He therefore 
attested that it would be impossible for these conditions to be placed on all nations equally as 
advanced labour standards would detrimentally affect a developing industrial state, like 
Japan.
117
 It was therefore agreed that amendments would be placed into the convention which 
gave nations such as Japan and India more time to achieve advanced labour conditions, in the 
areas such as of the minimum age of workers and the maximum hours of work.
118
 
It is therefore not surprising that many Australians shared Hughes‘ view and believed his 
actions against the clause were legitimate as a result. The National Labour Party, Hughes‘ 
political supporters after the split of the Labor party, pointed out that the Prime Minister 
should be congratulated for his actions at Paris. At the second annual conference at 
Kalgoorlie in May of 1919 they praised Hughes for expressing to the world, with a great 
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sense of tact, that the reason the clause had to be blocked was not due to the inferiority of the 
Japanese in race but only in their labour.
119
  
Furthermore, Adam McCay, a prominent Journalist who severed as a the special 
commissioner for the Sydney Sun, the Melbourne Herald and the West Australian, wrote a 
series of articles regarding the industrial conditions of Japan in relation to White Australia 
and the rejection of the racial equality amendment. McCay reassured his readers that the 
White Australia policy was ‗economic wisdom‘ and that Australia‘s role at Paris was not 
openly resented by the Japanese.  While he conceded Japan was beyond a ‗feudal‘ stage,120 
and that the Japanese were asking for more industrial rights by the ‗gleam of twilight‘ of a 
labour movement,
121
 he argued Japanese workmen were less able than their white 
counterparts. McCay also emphasised that Japan lacked unions and that some Japanese even 
admitted Japan‘s factory conditions were ‗evil‘.122  
Indeed McCay dedicated a whole article to the horrific conditions of Japanese girls working 
at factories. He decried the twelve hour days that the girls at a textile factory were made to 
work, pointing out how these young girls slept in the daylight hours as if they were ‗babies 
toiling through the midnight.‘ Given this and the widespread child labour in Japanese 
industry he witnessed, McCay scoffed that while ‗Japan claims to worship the ideals of racial 
equality. In the labour clauses of the peace agreement at Paris there are ideas of human 
equality, which may be surely dubbed equally precious.‘123  
However, it critical that this ideological position left McCay in an awkward position when 
asked by a Japanese parliamentarian to tell Australians:  
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―that the labour conditions of Japan will improve, and that when they are like those of Australia 
we hope that the, race question will not prevent them from entering Australia." 
McCay confessed to his readership that: 
[He] hesitated to reply, but an English friend got us all out of trouble by remarking promptly:-
"When that day arrives there will be no need to make the request." I don't quite know what he 
meant, but it served.
124
 
This example illustrates how using White Australia to justify blocking racial equality, to 
preserve labour conditions, was made much more complex when the rise of Japanese 
industrial standards was considered.  
In fact, while McCay and groups like the NLP were convinced that the Japanese labour was 
inherently lower, hence justifying preserving White Australia by rejecting racial equality, 
others believed in, and even embraced, the improvement of Japanese labour standards. For 
example, the Australian media dedicated a great deal of attention to the statements of the 
former Bishop of North Queensland Dr. George Frodsham, at the time the Paris negotiations. 
At first Frodsham‘s comments seem to reflect the views of Hughes and McCay as he had 
attested that ‗it was no insult to say that the Japanese could undersell us because of the 
conditions under which they live‘ and that ‗unrestricted immigration would destroy the new-
born ideals of a White Australia.‘ Nevertheless, as reported in these articles, the ex-Bishop 
attested that he believed that said conditions ‗were not likely to continue indefinitely‘. 125  
Frodsham had expanded on this view in an article he wrote for the British periodical The 
Nineteenth Century and After. Here he referred to the Australian fear of being swamped by 
inferior Asiatic coolies as something he did not personally believe in. He pointed out that it 
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was entirely possible for the industrial conditions of Japan to become more or less equal with 
those of Australia. In fact he maintained that when working conditions were equal ‗the 
Japanese can confidently expect that racial restriction [as enacted by Australia], which 
naturally galls a proud nation will be removed‘.126  
In the same vein, at least in the early stages of the Japanese application at Paris, the writers of 
the Lone Hand, an Australian political periodical, took a similarly ideological line. It was 
argued that while Australia appreciated Japan‘s appeal to the League as an attempt to resolve 
racial difficulties, it could not be successful at that time due to ‗racial differences‘ in labour 
standards. However, the journal resolved that these conditions were already changing in 
Japan, and while it may take several generations, it was believed that they would eventually 
disappear.
127
 
In fact evidence demonstrates how Australian commentators went further arguing that the 
reason for the policy‘s enactment was the superior labour ability of the Japanese over whites, 
an opinion that was clearly divergent form Hughes‘ and Eggleston‘s. In a letter to the editor 
of the West Australian one Australian pointed out that the Japanese should see White 
Australia as a compliment. The Japanese, they argued, were feared because of the virtue of 
their thrift. They argued that, whereas a white worker would get his wage and would then 
waste it on the racecourse or the local publican, a Japanese man could work for half the same 
wage and save enough to become a ‗small capitalist‘.128 Even the Australia Workers Union 
[AWU], which adamantly supported White Australia as a fundamental policy for working 
standards,
129
 also stressed the greater ability of Asiatic workers. A clear example of this is the 
trial that took place over the employment of Asians in the sugar growing industry, in which 
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the Queensland AWU attempted to obtain a court ruling that harvesting should be performed 
by white labour. In the trial, which coincided with finalizing of events in Versailles, the 
Southern district secretary of the AWU, Frederic Martyn, gave evidence to support a ban on 
coloured workers to the effect that they could work hours with which no white man could 
compete.
130
  
This view had a sustained historical, political background. Willard pointed out that 
throughout the history of White Australia it was the virtues of the Japanese and Chinese, such 
as endurance, energy and adaptability, which made them dangerous and in the eyes of White 
Australia advocates.  Given that they had a lower standard of living, the increased 
competiveness was unfairly balanced in their favour over white workers.
131
 Even former 
Attorney General and Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, indicated as much at the introduction of 
the 1901 immigration act. Deakin argued that it was the virtues of Asiatics, like Japan, that 
made them feared: 
[The Asiatics‘] inexhaustible energy, their power of applying themselves to new tasks, their 
endurance and their low standard of living that make them such competitors.
132
  
Indeed in terms of the pearling industry many Australians conceded that Japanese labour far 
more suitable than white labour. Meaney points out that, even though there were calls for the 
repatriation of Japanese divers at the establishment of the White Australia policy an 
exception was made due to the dependence of this industry on Japanese labour.
133
 
Furthermore, Willard pointed out that the pearl industry remained a necessary exception to 
White Australia. She referred to an experiment where nine European divers were brought to 
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see how effective they were, as white labourers, in comparison to the Asiatic pearlers. 
Willard explained that these divers were not as successful as there Asiatic counterparts and it 
was concluded that the industry should remain the same. This, she argued, was only 
strengthened by the fact that white Australians were unwilling and unsuited to do such risky 
work.
134
 
Australian socialist internationalists, who are often neglected due to their minority 
position,
135
 were even more adamant in their recommendation of the Japanese worker. In her 
book The Japanese Labour Movement, written a few years after the Conference, Christian 
Jollie Smith, co-founder of the Communist Party of Australia,
136
 appealed to Australian 
socialists not to disregard their Japanese comrades and brand them as unequals in race or 
labour. She emphasised that there were small but strong social democratic movements 
occurring in Japan which strove to improve the conditions of workers.
137
 Pointing to their 
endurance, thirst for knowledge and keenness to fight industrial evils, she recommended that 
Australian labourers should make contact with these Japanese workers for their mutual 
benefit.
138
 In response to the ideas that the Japanese in Australia were cheap workers she 
asked why Australians should not ‗welcome them into the unions and make their energy part 
of our struggle? A strike with such men as these in it should show few signs of collapse.‘139  
Therefore, far from agreeing with Hughes‘ statements about the inferiority of the Japanese as 
workers, the above examples show that a broad section of the Australian public considered 
the opposite to be true. Some believed that these conditions would not be the case for long 
                                                 
134
 Willard, A History of the White Australia Policy, pp. 186-7 
135
 The only work the makes any particular mention of these groups in Lake and Reynolds, see Lake et al., 
Drawing the Global Colour Line, p. 159. 
136
 Joy Damousi, 'Smith, Christian Brynhild Ochiltree Jollie (1885–1963)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, 
National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/smith-christian-
brynhild-ochiltree-jollie-8465/text14885, accessed 18 September 2011. 
137
C. J. Smith, The Japanese Labour Movement, (Melbourne: Will Andrade, May 1923) , p. 4. 
138
 Ibid, pp. 7-14. 
139
 Ibid, pp. 14-15 
47 | P a g e  
 
while others went so far as to argue that the Japanese worker was more effective than a white 
worker. Furthermore, even when these groups agreed with Australia‘s actions in denying 
racial equality it is evident that they did not conceptualise the problems it brought to White 
Australia in the same way as Hughes or Eggleston. To many Australians the Japanese were 
―unequal‖ but they were not the inferior.   
 
The problem of the “Empty North”: Ineffective White Labour  
In fact one of the most controversial issues that surrounded Australia‘s involvement in 
blocking the racial equality clause, which has almost universally neglected by the current 
literature on the clause, was one that dealt directly with the issue of the suitability of white 
labour versus coloured. This was the problem of the ―Empty North‖. The Empty North was 
the ideological and practical concern that the Northern or tropical regions of Australia were 
not being effectively used. That due to the small size of the white population that inhabited 
them, these areas had suffered from extensive labour shortages and had therefore been left 
underdeveloped.
140
  The following examples demonstrate that a diverse range of views 
existed around labour and White Australia at the time of the Conference because of this 
problem. Furthermore, it is evident that the solutions which were often advocated to resolve 
the Empty North, by some groups, were completely opposed to how Hughes had represented 
―Australia‘s‖ view of White Australia in regards to the Japanese clause. 
The concern of some Australians about the suitability of the white race to populate these 
tropical regions is evident from federation.
141
 Indeed in the first years of the newly federated 
state a speech by Dr. J. S. C. Elkington on this vey topic was published as a government 
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paper. Elkington, the chief health officer of Tasmania, reassured that the objections to the 
suitability of white workers in the North were not well founded. He concluded the only 
problem was of instilling ‗common sense‘ into white Australians to adopt the necessary 
hygiene to prevent tropical disease and that, once people were educated in these matters, a 
white population could hold the North. This, he remarked, would be preferred to coloured 
labour given that White Australia was the ‗national pluck‘. However, he conceded that if the 
difficulties were not overcome the ‗alternative of a coloured population is always feasible‘ 
and that something must be done to prevent a ‗dog in the manger‘ situation.142  
In contrast, later studies concluded that the white race was not suited to work in the tropics at 
all. In their comprehensive study, released in May of 1919: ‗Tropical Australia and its 
Settlement‘, Dr. A. Breinl and Dr. W. J. Young of the Australia Institute of Tropical 
Medicine related great difficulties in populating the North with whites.
143
 An article written 
by the journal following the report praised Breinl and Young for contributing to a much 
debated subject. White Australia, its writer argued, was dependent on whether whites were 
able to develop the North to a sufficient degree to justify the exclusion of Asiatics. Indeed, in 
reference to Breinl‘s and Young‘s theories that a form of neurasthenia developed in whites 
living in tropical areas, which led them to become less productive, the writer indicated that if 
conclusively proved this ‗must be regarded as a very serious detriment to the carrying 
through of the White Australia policy‘144. Breinl and Young were not outsiders in this 
conclusion as other doctors supported of their research. Dr. F Antill Pockley, which was 
described by one Australian newspaper as having the ‗unanimous opinion of the members of 
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his profession‘,145 praised Breinl and Young‘s research and lamented that Australia lacked 
what it needed most: coloured labour to populate the North.
146
  
 Dr. D. Hastings Young also evidently agreed with these ideas which he conveyed in his 
work: A White Australia: Is It Possible? Young was convinced that the conditions of the 
North were completely unsuitable for the whites, describing it as an ‗established fact‘.147 
Referring to the arguments that white Australian‘s could work in the Northern Territory given 
special garments and housing, Young argued that: 
The mere fact of the white man having to use every artificial means in his power, in order to exist 
in an artificial environment, should be in itself evidence that he is by nature unfitted to settle in a 
tropical climate. The black man, with his pigmented skin, can work under a tropical sun without 
any covering to his head, and will not suffer from either heat stroke of sun stroke; but his pale-
faced white brother dare not take such liberties.
148
 
Young argued that the failure of the White Australia to populate the North had been 
economically detrimental to Australia as the North had not been developed. To make this 
point he referenced Bishop Gilbert White‘s arguments: that the North could be used for 
increased mining development and cattle farms
149
, and expanded upon them by pointing out 
that increased development meant more jobs for white Australians. 
150
 
Young proposed the solution for these problems was that a colour line be drawn with Asiatics 
in the North and whites in the South of Australia. He advocated for the immigration of 
Indians in this solution as they belonged ‗to the same Empire‘ and were ‗inured to a 
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somewhat analogous climate to that of tropical Australia.‘151 Furthermore, being equal 
imperial subjects, Young argued that the Indian immigrants had more knowledge of the 
British character than any other coloured peoples and indicated that any discrimination they 
received was unjustified due to their intelligence.
152
 Indeed Young did link these problems to 
Japan‘s clause as he believed that only by having a coloured population to fill the North 
effectively could Australia face the claim Japanese could have made at the Conference that 
Japan should be allowed the territory white Australians could not use.
153
 Clearly in Young‘s 
schema at least imperial Indian subjects were racial equal to whites and possibly even more 
effective than white workers in certain climates 
As the following sources show the arguments were not just limited to the scientific domain 
but were part of widespread discussion with contributors in both political and public spheres. 
For example, South Australian Premier, Henry Barwell, was convinced that the White 
Australia policy had not served the Northern territory. A few years after the events at Paris 
Barwell pointed out that indentured coloured labour would be required to populate the 
tropical regions of Australia.
154
 Therefore, he stated such labour should be allowed in certain 
areas with those leaving the area receiving punishment.
155
 He attested that anyone who had 
worked or lived in the North recognised the need for coloured labour since white labour had 
failed despite the amount of time it had had to develop. Barwell believed that the White 
Australia policy would have to be modified, especially given the world attention it had 
received. Indeed he argued that blind faith in White Australia had put Australia into a 
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dangerous position since the world‘s nations observed Australia and its ineffective use of 
resources more ‗than ever they have been in the past‘.156 Barwell also linked this to the 
population problems of Japan were he noted it was ‗unreasonable of Australia to say that no 
one else shall develop this land when Japan is so close with her teeming population.‘157 
Barwell‘s assertions were not isolated either. Sir Edward Lucas the Agent General of South 
Australia indicated that there was, in the Australian community, ‗a wide divergence of 
opinion on the employment of coloured labour in the Northern Territory.‘158 
An example of this view in the public domain is found in an article published in the Mercury 
in December of 1918 where it was openly stated that the author was in favour, not only of 
racial equality, but also Asiatic immigration to fill the North. Having received a cable which 
foreshadowed the Japanese clause, the author predicted that the Japanese demand would 
seriously challenge White Australia and that Australia would have little excuse to deny the 
Japanese request, since Britain would support Japan as an ally. Furthermore, it decried the 
‗supercilious‘ attitude that white workers were in some way superior to educated Asiatics, as 
‗ridiculous‘, ‗selfish‘ and ‗impolite.‘ It stated such a view was incredulous since the Japanese 
had been a good ally to Australia and had assisted in the war effort. In addition the writer 
mentioned the failure to settle the Empty North and stated that White Australia was mainly 
responsible for it. The writer claimed it to be ‗conclusive proved‘ by science and history that 
white labour was not suitable to work in tropical climates. The writer therefore advocated for 
an allowance of an Asiatic settlement established in the North, which would not only provide 
                                                 
156
 ‗Asiatics for North‘, The Argus, 7 January 1922, p. 17. 
157
 ‗White Australia: Sir Henry Barwell‘s Views in an American Interview‘, Barrier Miner, 16 June 1922, p. 1. 
158
 ‗White Australia: Mr. Barwell Defended‘, Sydney Morning Herald, 12 January 1922, p. 9; In fact Barwell‘s 
statements caused a fair amount of debate with contributors such as  the acting High Commissioner of the 
Commonwealth, Mr M. L. Sheppard and the former Home Secretary and Treasurer of Queensland Peter Airey 
also weighing in to debate: For Sheppard‘s criticism and stanch advocating of White Australia see ‗The 
Northern Territory‘, The Mercury, 9 January 1922, p. 6; For Airey‘s divided opinion between ineffective white 
labourers and Barwell‘s ―radical‖ solutions see ‗Barwell and the Brown Brother‘, Northern Standard, 24 March 
1922, p. 1. 
52 | P a g e  
 
the necessary concession in order to thank Japan but that efficient coloured labour could 
exploit the resources of the North for the good of the nation.
159
 
In fact, evidence demonstrates that this was a common view for Australians of the North.  On 
his return from a trip to the North Mr. J. T. Davies, secretary of the West Australian Brick 
and Pottery Union,
160
 was interviewed by the West Australian about the development of 
Australia‘s tropics. Davies expressed that he was shocked that he could not find sympathy 
with his view on White Australia. He related that many in the North were not opposed to 
indentured Asiatic immigration as a means of developing the North.
161
 Similarly a letter 
signed ‗Old Territorian‘ published in the Adelaide Advertiser claimed that White Australia 
had limited the North‘s development and unless ‗suitable cheap labour‘ was allowed to enter 
‗it would remain undeveloped till the end of time.‘162 Once again a Mr J Egerton-Warburton, 
who the media noted as a Territorian with the ‗authority of 28 years experience‘, rejected 
White Australia as he believed it had left the North underdeveloped. Egerton-Warburton 
claimed that he held the views common to many settlers in the North and the administration 
of the North had been unpopular for considerable amount of time due to the lack of 
development.
163
 
Even those who were not convinced by such arguments still recognised the controversy of the 
―Empty North‖ and linked it to the sustained discussion over the rejection of the racial 
equality clause. Eggleston coupled the problem of the Empty North to the controversy 
surrounding Australia‘s opposition to the proposal. Here he hoped to reassure his readers that 
whites could indeed populate the tropical areas. However, in an unedited draft of the Colour 
Bar memo he noted that although white Australians had managed to colonise Australia in a 
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satisfactory manner, the failure to settle the Northern Territory and exploit it economically 
was the ‗main issue outstanding‘ of White Australia. Again while not in the final draft it is 
notable that he even wrote that White Australia was probably ‗contrary to the economic 
interest of the present generation of Australian workers.‘164  
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Defence too was a major theme in the Australian debate over the denial of racial equality and 
the development of the Australian nation. The ideology of self determinism, which served as 
the foundation for the new international order of which the League was the framework, 
established the nation as both a progressive and sovereign unit. Hence, whether or not a 
nation could remain a sovereign unit was pivotal to its legitimacy. This chapter will 
demonstrate that much like labour, defence was a key concern in discussions over the racial 
equality proposal since it was perceived as a threat to White Australia. It is shown how the 
current historiography demonstrates that the Australian public believed White Australia had 
to be maintained to preserve sovereignty.  Indeed evidence does indeed show that, since it 
prevented unrestricted immigration of, possibly hostile, Asiatic nationals into Australia, 
Australians often advocated White Australia as a preventative measure to racial conflict or 
even invasion by an Asiatic enemy. Nevertheless this thesis will also focus on the often 
neglected sections of the Australian public who questioned whether White Australia was in 
fact the best way of guaranteeing defence, especially in relation to the proposal. That, in fact, 
White Australia was seen as problematic to maintaining sovereignty as a possible contributor 
to the problem of the Empty North and an insult to a militaristic Japan.  The examples in this 
section illustrate the dissenting voices of many Australians who insisted on a more sombre 
and wise approach to the clause, White Australia and international relations in general. 
Australia, it was often proposed, should use diplomacy and concession in regards to White 
Australia to guarantee defence relations and avoid insulting Japan as Hughes had done. 
The Japanese Menace: The Yellow Peril 
At the time of the Peace Conference and in the decade or so after it paranoia swelled that 
Australia could be invaded by Japan, the nation who came to represent the growing strength 
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of an Asiatic menace. Sir Charles Henry Pearson, an English-born Australian liberal 
academic, contributed greatly to the growing fear of Asiatic races by establishing an 
intellectual framework where Eastern states were seen as rising in power.  Pearson promoted 
this notion in his 1892 book: National Life and Character: a Forecast. As Lake and 
Reynolds show this work had a great impact because it challenged the dominant imperial 
doctrine of white race superiority.
165
 That contrary to the popular belief of Asiatic 
subservience to whites, Pearson had stressed that these Eastern peoples could in fact obtain 
independence as nation states and ‗thrust aside‘ the Anglo-Saxon powers.166  
Furthermore Pearson‘s work had a substantial effect in shaping White Australia. Australia‘s 
first Prime Minister, Edmund Barton, quoted from National Life at the establishment of the 
1901 Immigration Restriction Act as a justification for the policy.  Barton embraced Pearson 
as a great intellectual and made particular reference to Pearson‘s statements on the threat of 
the rising Asiatic nations when introducing the policy. Therefore, as Lake and Reynolds 
persuasively argue, White Australia had been formulated as a system where Australia 
proclaimed its white national identity as progressive and hence sought to protect it to counter 
the threat of the Eastern races.
167
 
The Japanese menace became more foreboding after Japan‘s victory in the 1905 Russo-
Japanese war. The war had begun over conflicting territorial interests in the Korean peninsula 
between Japan and Russia. After a series of successful battles the Japanese took the 
fortifications at Port Arthur (Shantung) and the Russian forces conceded defeat. This result 
was unprecedented as it was the first time in history that an Asiatic nation had won over a 
white power. Indeed it sent shockwaves all over the Western world since many Western 
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leaders and political figures, including Australians, believed in the continuance of white 
world dominance.
168
 Japan, in this act of military success, believed it was established as a 
―great power‖ of the world with equal status and civilisation to that of the Western powers. 
169
 This unprecedented victory meant that Australians now envisaged Japan as a Pacific 
enemy that had proven it was capable against the white powers of the world which had an 
advanced military capacity.  
It is plain to see that these security fears were prevalent in Australia at the time of the Peace 
Conference and the years immediately following. Racial equality was seen as both an 
external and internal threat. The former related to the fear that a growing militant Japan may 
look to Australia to relieve its resource and population pressures; the Japanese amendment 
threatened unlimited immigration and could allow mass immigration of Japanese to the South 
Pacific islands where military bases for invasion could be established. This anxiety is 
exposed in a report prepared for Joseph Cook, Australian delegate to the Peace Conference 
and minister of the Navy, by Latham. The report deals with the mandatory system of the ex-
German Pacific islands and namely how important obtaining a mandate was in terms of 
Australian security. Latham expresses the serious question for the Australian delegation was 
whether the nation holding the mandate could exert its existing immigration restriction laws 
on the territory mandated to it. Latham believed this was paramount since without any 
guarantee of maintaining these restrictions a large Japanese population could move south to 
these islands where upon he feared that ‗an ―incident‖ might occur which would have the 
‗gravest results.‘170 
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The latter fear was that of internal racial conflict stemming from the co-interaction of two 
completely alien races. An article in the July edition of The Bulletin presents this fear as 
justification for Australia‘s actions at Paris. The writer argues that if immigration restriction 
laws were broken down, as would occur with the acceptance of the Japanese amendment, it 
would mean Australia would become weak with racial conflict, fall to bolshevism and be left 
open to attack. The reporter stated that the completely alien living conditions of the Japanese 
could not possibly meld with an Australian way of life and conflict would occur. In fact using 
Broome as an example,
171
 it was claimed that such conflict had already resulted from this 
difference and a breakdown of White Australia would mean that conditions would be 
degraded to such a degree that a Bolshevist revolution was bound to follow.
172
 
Even Hughes; political opponents in the labour party shared this fear. Labor Premier of 
Queensland, Thomas Ryan,
173
 criticised Hughes for not doing enough to protect White 
Australia and Australia‘s security, claiming that Hughes had allowed Japan to mandate the 
North Pacific islands and move closer to Australia.
174
  Some members of the Labor party, 
going against party policy, even agreed with Hughes‘ calls for conscription since conscription 
was seen as a way to defend against Japan. At the New South Wales Labor conference of 
1919, when Mr P. Brookfield set forth a motion that the delegates to the interstate Labor 
conference advocate for an elimination of the compulsory defence act he was met with 
staunch opposition by Mr Albert Gardiner and Mr James Catts. Gardiner argued that due to 
the Japanese ambition to dominate the South Pacific, Australia would have to be ready to 
fight to sustain a White Australia. Likewise Catts, who believed that Japan had designs on 
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Australia,
175
 pointed out that Brookfield had not offered any alternative for defence and that 
Australia could not depend on the British Navy.
176
 
 
“Empty North”: The Charge of Ineffectual Occupation 
It is therefore evident throughout the aforementioned sources that many Australians who 
feared the Japanese advocated for staunch adherence to the White Australia policy to 
guarantee Australian security. However, as demonstrated by the following examples, many 
groups who held the same concerns about defence advocated against a hard-line approach to 
the White Australia policy. That either by their own advocating or by their reflection on the 
assertions of commentators on the situation, Australians recognised the problem of the Empty 
North was as much a concern for defence as it was for labour. These sources show how many 
Australians were convinced that unwavering support for a White Australia, whether it meant 
not allowing some Japanese or coloured workers or even ―undesirable‖ whites, actually 
threatened Australia‘s security. Australia was placed in a dangerous position by being the 
―dog in the manger‖. 
 Australian medical professional Dr Hastings Young who, as previously mentioned, had 
argued the impossibility of maintaining White Australia as white labour was not effective in 
tropical regions, directly tied this to defence concerns and the Japanese situation. Young 
argued the White Australia policy had simply hampered populating the North and a staunch 
adherence to it only served to insult Japan and threaten Australian security. Referring to the 
need of the Japanese to find land to send their excess population, he questioned Australia‘s 
right to have a completely white workforce: 
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This superabundant and increasing population must eventually seek elbow room in other lands and 
could we blame a virile, warlike, proud people, such as the Japanese, if they were to cast longing eyes 
upon a vast stretch of unoccupied country, which we possess and fail to make satisfactory use of?
177
 
Young connected these problems to the actions of Hughes and the Australian delegation at 
the Peace Conference, expressing that these were ‗reported to have given great offence to the 
Japanese delegates‘. He pointed out that Australia had been lucky, since, without their 
‗characteristically gentlemanly deportment‘, the Japanese delegates could have responded 
with a challenge, based on ‗moral right‘, to Australian territory with the charge of ineffectual 
occupation. Young stressed that to deny entry to Indians as imperial subjects was not only 
‗selfish‘ but also ‗illogical‘ given that they could fill the North and create a defensive barrier 
of populace to the ‗menace of the Eastern nations‘.178  
Likewise, the Bishop of Willochra, Reverend Gilbert White, who stood as a frequent 
commentator on the problem of the Empty North,
179
 stressed the seriousness of the issue in 
terms of the Japanese threat. In his opinion Australians could no longer deny that projects 
designed to encourage white settlement had failed in the tropics; a dangerous position given 
the rise of Eastern nations such as Japan and China. In an article to the Sydney Morning 
Herald he reminded his readers that Australia lacked defence and that the League of Nations 
did not sympathise with Australia‘s ‗dog-in-the-manger policy‘. He therefore personally 
advocated that the colour line to be drawn between the North and South of Australia.
180
 
Although he had previously conceded that such a policy would be unpopular, 
181
 White 
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expressed that it would be much better for Australian to adapt a system where it could 
regulate a coloured workforce, as opposed to a situation where an Asiatic nation would 
challenge Australia‘s right to its territory and simply take the North by invasion.182 
Even as the dealings of Paris proceeded, Australian popular media linked issues of an ―Empty 
North‖ and the Japanese alleged desire to expand, to the adoption of the clause. The monthly 
periodical the Lone Hand offers a pertinent example of this. The articles of the Lone Hand, 
which as previously mentioned, had in the early developments of the conference recognised 
the progress and legitimate desire of the Japanese, changed to a tone of fear headlining by the 
problem of the Empty North. In an article dated for the 7 April 1919 and titled ‗The Problem 
of the North‘ the magazine feared that no Australian statesmen, including Hughes, had  
understood the gravity of the issue and could stand up to the charge of ―Ineffectual 
Occupation‖ which the ‗court of nations‘ could level at Australia.183 The article of the next 
month entitled ‗Our Fighting Frontier‘ went further by stressing that an inherent danger was 
lurking by the name of ―Ineffective Occupation‖. The author reminded readers that the 
British Empire had used the term to justify the taking of lands from native peoples so unless 
Australian leaders were prepared to pay to occupy the North, Australia would be forfeited to 
Asiatics like Japan.
184
 In fact while editors of the Lone Hand were clearly not in favour of 
any form of Asiatic immigration to solve these problems, one article reported that a certain 
Melbourne paper had gone to the extreme of suggesting Asiatic immigration. Therefore, it 
was stressed that Australian statesmen had to act to secure the North in order to stop the 
development of such radical solutions.
185
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These problems gained imperial recognition as the opinions of foreign intellectuals were 
widely discussed and reflected upon by the Australian public and media, convincing 
Australian‘s of the urgent need to solve the problems of the North. Commentators from 
Britain were especially interested in this issue as they saw it as not just a problem for 
Australia but one in which the integrity of the whole empire was involved. In an effort to 
convey these concerns to an Australian audience, imperial commentators often travelled to 
Australia. One, the respected imperial traveller Lieut. Colonel Eldred Pottinger, visited 
several years after the conference in order to conduct a review of Australian defences and 
give a lecture at Hobart about the need for defence. The press indicated that while Pottinger 
was well received as an advocate for the White Australian policy he had also pressed that 
Australia needed to populate with a greater white populace to justify such a policy.
186
  
Pottinger released a book on this very subject: Asiatic Problems Affecting Australia, which 
was published in Melbourne in 1928, in order to drive the defence message home, that the 
brash diplomacy of Australia, without a filled North, had insulted Japan and continued to 
threaten defence. In the book Pottinger represented Japan as justified in calming racial 
equality as it only wished to be treated as an equal great nation of the world. He indicated that 
due to the problems that stem from having a large populace, Japan had a genuine need to 
encourage emigration and that by remaining unpopulated Australia‘s security in jeopardy. 
Furthermore, by taking such a staunch position as they had done at the League, Pottinger 
pointed out that the Dominions, including Australia, had forced Japan into a position where it 
believed that its ‗legitimate national aspirations‘ were being ‗thwarted‘ . Indeed, he argued, as 
no nation had given ‗advice‘ on how to solve its problems Japan would take its ‗own course, 
even if it meant war.‘ He stressed that the negative position the Dominions had advocated, 
that immigration was simply a domestic issue, was not longer viable. Indeed he hoped that 
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the staunch stance of Dominions of the Pacific would be dealt with by the next Imperial 
conference and suggested that Australia think about how its representative would approach 
this question given its importance.
187
 The book was well received by the Australian press in 
that the Portland Guardian stated that Pottinger‘s argument was ‗unshakable‘, his reason 
‗measured‘ and his case ‗unanswerable‘ while the Register claimed it was a ‗book that every 
Australian should read.‘188 
Likewise, after visiting Australia, British imperial traveller Fleetwood Chidell released a 
book entitled Australia: White or Yellow, which questioned the advantages of White 
Australia, given how unpopular the ideal was internationally. Chidell argued that the 
Japanese proposal had been a missed opportunity where future conflict could have been 
avoided since the amendment would have forbidden ‗all un-called-for harshness in 
discrimination of colour.‘189 He implored Australians to recognise that the build-up of the 
Japanese military, coupled with its need to send its excess population to the less populated 
lands of the world, like Australia, meant that conflict between Australia and Japan would be 
inevitable if White Australia was maintained.
190
 Chidell proposed that the tropical section of 
Australia, where he argued a coloured worker was far superior to his white counterpart, 
should be reserved for coloured settlement. This, he attested, would not only allay any 
negative feeling that the Japanese, or any other coloured nation felt towards Australia, but 
that increased productivity from exploiting the North would also mean more capital to build 
up aerial and naval defences.
191
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It is not hard to imagine how such a work inspired much discussion in Australia as it directly 
challenged White Australia. Indeed many Australian newspapers were openly cynical of 
Chidell‘s arguments. The Advertiser reported that the book was an attempt to scare 
Australians into abandoning their policy. It was pointed out a concession in the form of a 
section of the North, as Chidell advocated, would do little to alleviate Japanese resentment as 
Japan would still want racial equality. This, it was argued, Australia could not agree to as it 
jeopardised the ideal of a nation controlling its own racial composition. Furthermore it 
doubted that Japanese hostility to Australia, claiming that any demand of territory made by 
Japan would be ‗unreasonable‘.192  
However, while other newspapers were also critical of Chidell‘s proposals they conceded on 
his point on the need to populate the North in terms of the Japanese menace. For example, an 
article in the Sydney Morning Herald reported that while many Australian‘s would see 
Chidell as greatly exaggerating the danger from Japan, Chidell‘s essential reasoning was 
sound and that Australia would leave itself open to a foreign challenge if it did not fill its 
unoccupied regions.
193
 Similarly, a book review in the West Australian expressed that while 
Chidell‘s proposal of a coloured settlement was impractical and would lead to racial conflict, 
his work was a ‗sober review‘ of Australia‘s dangerous position and served as a wakeup call 
to those of a ‗parochial mind‘ who did not see the necessity for extensive immigration. It 
claimed that unless this could be achieved somehow the morality of White Australia would 
come into question.
194
 
That Chidell‘s work impressed on to public minds is obvious when the statements of 
Reverend Canon Garland of Brisbane are reviewed. Garland, the Brisbane Courier reported, 
had given a speech to the Church of England Men‘s Society where he referred to Chidell‘s 
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book stating that any Australian who had read it could no longer be apathetic to the danger 
that Australia faced due to the ineffective occupation of the North. Garland pointed out that 
had the 1925 protocol of Geneva been passed White Australia policy would have ceased to 
exist as it already insulted Japan and China.
195
 Garland made particular reference to the 
comments of a Japanese professor, to show how Japan felt especially slighted by the fact that 
Australia blocked their immigration as white Australians had not been able to populate the 
North. He therefore advanced the point that Australia was in desperate need of white 
immigration, even if unsuitable, and concluded that White Australia was not guaranteed since, 
using the statements of a Chinese consul, the Aboriginals had lost their rights to the land 
since they had not effectively used it.
196
 
 
Abusing an Ally: Calling for War, Preparing for Peace  
Even beyond the problems of the Empty North it is evident from the following examples that 
some Australians were concerned that Australia had antagonised a nation that could 
potentially be a great ally and friend. Indeed criticism formed that, by Australian actions at 
the Conference of not making some sort of concession and without taking any defence 
measures, Australia had simply insulted Japan and endangered its security.  This concern was 
only further exasperated by Hughes‘ very brash affirmation of the White Australia policy at 
the conference and the period following. 
Major. Piesse stands out as a personality who exemplified this view. Piesse was at odds with 
Hughes because he believed that Japan could only become a threat to Australia if insulted. 
Hence he advocated that a concession be made to Japan in terms of immigration and racial 
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equality. For instance, in the previously mentioned memo, where Piesse had defended his 
department in light of Senator Millen‘s criticisms, he questioned White Australia‘s ability to 
guarantee defence. Piesse stated that while he was for a White Australia in terms of 
protecting labour, he was against the way the policy was enforced to stop the internal conflict 
of races as this point was hard to justify without resorting to racial discrimination. Referring 
to the events of Paris, Piesse pointed out that the denial of racial equality had left Hughes 
with a reputation in Japan, equivalent to that of the British view of Kaiser Wilhelm. 
Moreover he claimed that if restrictions that were purely racially discriminatory were not 
removed, Australia would struggle to justify White Australia to the international community. 
He further questioned the worth of not making concessions since he believed that the 
inevitable result of insulting Japan would be war.
197
 In fact, as Meany shows, Piesse wrote a 
series of reports at the time of the Conference in which he advocated for modifications to 
White Australia in order to prevent an Australian-Japanese conflict. In these he indicated that 
the Hughes‘ attitude at the Conference caused a disservice to Australia as it gave more 
excuses for Japan to become militant.
198
 
In fact sixteen years after the Conference Piesse was adamant that Australian abuses towards 
Japan had caused, and were still causing at that point, troubles for Australian defence. In a 
pamphlet entitled Japan and the Defence of Australia Piesse, via the alias of ‗Albatross‘, 
highlighted the threat that a militant Japan caused for Australia since the Japanese military 
had a large influence on the government.
199
 Piesse argued that Japan had no ‗major interest‘ 
in Australia and the only point of antagonism between the nations was White Australia. 
Piesse maintained that Japan saw White Australia as an insult; it seemingly brandishing the 
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Japanese as inferior in race.
200
 He attested that any Australian who believed that White 
Australia caused no tension in Japan need only refer to English versions of Japanese 
newspaper articles around the denial of the racial equality clause to find evidence to the 
contrary. Indeed for Piesse the actions of Hughes at Paris had nearly caused ‗a storm of fury 
in Japan against Australia.‘201 
Taking this further, imperial traveller and author Oliver Bainbridge travelled to Australia in 
an attempt to convince that Japan was an ally not an enemy. Bainbridge was invited by the 
Empire Literature Society of Sydney to present a speech on the position of Japan as an ally to 
Australia and the Empire. He attested that Japan had been a great friend to the allies during 
the war, having stood by Britain with no direct obligation to do so, and its claims at the 
League were in no way ‗unreasonable‘. Bainbridge explained Japan‘s territorial demands as 
only a demand to open up Japan‘s commercial opportunities. Furthermore, he argued that the 
racial equality clause was not something Japan took seriously, only an obliged action, and 
Japan‘s real intention was towards commercial enterprise which would not interfere with 
Australia‘s domestic concerns.202 He dismissed the idea that Japan looked to Australia‘s 
resources as ‗illogical‘ given that Japan already had easy access to resources in the continent 
of Asia.
203
 Therefore, it should come as no surprise that in using the words used of William 
Watt, who stood as acting Prime Minister when Hughes was at Paris, Bainbridge encouraged 
Australia to ‗cherish the friendship of Japan.‘204 
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Although Bainbridge was a foreign commentator, evidence shows that Australians did reflect 
on his statements and agreed with his concerns and assertions about the need to remain 
friendly with Japan. The president of the Sydney Branch of the Empire Literature Society, the 
Honourable G. F. Earp, praised Bainbridge‘s speech as ‗facts which have been so delightfully 
presented‘. In relating why he had allowed Bainbridge to give this speech Earp pointed out 
that he agreed with Bainbridge in that Japan was a great ally and friend and that he saw no 
threat from Japan in terms of preserving White Australia: 
[Japan‘s] policy with regard to White Australia does not run counter to ours, but fits with it, for Japan 
does not encourage emigration of her people to Australia, and, in fact, refuses passports to her 
labourers for such a purpose
205
 
In much the same vein the Reverend Lewis Radford, the Bishop of Goulburn
206
, also praised 
Bainbridge for his comments. After pointing out how it was clear that Japan was an 
advancing nation, making particular reference to its technological achievements, Radford 
emphasised that a future of friendship between Australia and Japan. Although he admitted 
that international troubles existed between the nations he argued that these were not 
unsolvable. In fact he argued the any issue that arose could be overcome as long as both 
Japan and Australia ‗played the game‘.207 These views are evidently removed from Hughes‘ 
actions at the Peace Conference since, as indicated previously, it was clear that Hughes was 
very much convinced that Japan wished to challenge White Australia and was already the 
lurking enemy of the north. 
Furthermore evidence from public media sources show how some Australians saw little good 
coming out of Australia‘s denial of racial equality in that it needlessly insulted the Japanese. 
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Dr Monroe Anderson, a self-confessed former prejudiced Australian, related to the Register 
that after a trip to Japan he realised that Australia was greatly mistaken in its fear of the 
Japanese. Anderson admitted that in his opinion vast immigration of the Japanese to Australia 
was not acceptable as he believed racial mixing brought out undesirable racial characteristics. 
However, he argued that this was not the contention of the Japanese at Paris. The Japanese, 
he stated, were hurt only by the fact that racial equality had been denied for them and had 
little wish to migrate en mass to Australia instead preferring to go to Korea or Siberia. He 
attested that the case was, as one Japanese man related to him, that the denial of race equality 
had led the Japanese to believe they would be overtly discriminated against in Australia.  This 
led Anderson to challenge such discrimination as he questioned why the educated Japanese 
students, travellers or any ‗decent‘ Japanese ‗fellow‘ should be denied entry.208 Anderson 
therefore stands as clear example of an Australian that believed that the Japanese were not 
deserving of any overt discrimination which the denial of racial equality may have caused.   
Anderson did not leave the public eye either. In the following year the Sydney Morning 
Herald once again reported Anderson‘s comments after his return from another trip to Japan. 
Here it is evident that Anderson had become more concerned about Australia‘s defence. He 
referred mainly to the contradictory position of Australians who continued to claim that war 
with Japan was inevitable while relying on the security of a peaceful relationship. He 
presented the comments of the Mayor of Tokyo Baron Goto, who Anderson believed was 
quite likely to become prime minister of Japan, where the Baron indicated that Australia 
should rely on the League to protect its national aspirations. Anderson urged Australians to 
recognise that Japan had suffered too much abuse by those Australians who had insulted 
Japan declaring that they did so to protect a White Australia. The Empty North also featured 
in his argument where he belittled the catch cry of fighting Japan to the last man since it was 
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an idle threat given Australia was empty due to White Australia. Anderson attested that 
whether or not Australians did exclude the Japanese from entry, their actions should be 
performed as to not offend Japan as had been done. In sum he expressed dismay that even if 
he was wrong, and Japan did have malicious intentions towards Australia, Australia lacked 
defence and therefore the position of insulting Japan was the equivalent of committing 
Harakiri, Japanese ritual suicide.
209
 
As an example of a prominent academic and historian who held these views, Harold Lark 
Harris, argued that the position Australia had taken at Paris of no concessions would have to 
be altered if Australia did not wish to offend Japan.
210
 Writing in The Australian Highway the 
journal of the Workers' Educational Association of Australia at the time of the Conference 
Harris pointed out that the events of the Conference had substantially increased Australia‘s 
international responsibilities. For example, he explained, that if the ex-German South Pacific 
islands had been annexed as Hughes had wanted, Japan would have been granted the 
Northern islands to build fortifications on and tension would have manifested between the 
nations. Indeed he applauded the decision the League had made in regards to mandates as it 
would enable Australia to protect a White Australia and also meant that the League was 
responsible for their defence so Australian security was further guaranteed. However, he 
sensed that antagonism had been created with Japan by the denial of racial equality and he 
felt goodwill could only be acquired if the White Australia policy was modified to 
accommodate the Japanese and secure Australia. Although a believer in the benefits of a 
White Australia Harris believed the dictation test system was flawed: 
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We must find a way, if a way can be found, of avoiding the many serious social problems which 
follow upon the settlement of large numbers of those who, because they are members of a backward 
race, or because they come from the lowest station of race with very different ideals and customs from 
our own, endanger our social and economic well being; and we must do this without arousing the 
resentment of the whole race whose members are excluded. Applying this to the Japanese we may say 
that we should not seek to exclude the Japanese as Japanese, but only to exclude the Japanese of the 
lowest class. In other words the test applied to all would be migrants should be a real education test- 
not a dictation test, which is no test, but merely a means of cloaking our discrimination between 
races.
211
  
Indeed the opinions of those who attended the Woman‘s Political Association‘s debate on the 
White Australia and the denial of racial equality, show how these concerns over insulting 
Japan were even prevalent in whole organisations. The Woman Voter, an internationalist 
periodical, reported that the topic was one of great substance by generating a debate that 
surrounded the internationalist ideas of universal peace, (as opposed to fears of capitalist 
exploitation of cheap labour), of a socialist agenda. At the debate several speakers supported 
the racial equality clause and went against a White Australia, arguing acceptance was a step 
towards morality and peace. A Mrs Paling stated that she was ‗against the White Australia 
policy, because the ‗arming of brothers against each other is the only way it can be preserved‘. 
Similarly, a Mrs Singleton pointed out that Japanese clause was about equality not 
immigration, while a Miss Fullerton related her dismay that despite receiving Japanese help 
in the War ‗now Mr Hughes insults her in Paris.‘212 Indeed these speakers and other 
Australians such as Anderson and Harris reflected an attitude that was far removed from that 
which Hughes had stressed at the Peace Conference but just as forcefully advocated with 
Australia‘s best interest, as a nation, in mind; racial equality was not a clear threat to the 
Australians but insulting Japan was.  
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The significance of the Paris Peace Conference in the politics of the world‘s nations meant 
that the effects of actions taken at Versailles and their importance continued for both 
Australia and the whole of the international community. As a pivotal international event the 
proposal of the Japanese racial equality clause and its subsequent denial are exemplary of this. 
The history of the amendments rejection speaks volumes of how internationalism and the 
nation were defined at Versailles and in Australia. No matter how noble the clause seemed as 
a principle of equality, which would allow the cohesion of an international community, it was 
still the nation, with its sovereignty and its right to progress into a democracy, which should 
dictate the internationalism of the League.  
Indeed as Willard pointed out it was this understanding of the nation which had led to the 
Australia‘s general endorsement of the White Australia policy at the Conference. For Willard, 
Australian saw White Australia was a counter measure to unrestricted immigration. Such 
immigration, she attested, would leave Australia ‗with all the evils and dangers of a racial 
division in her community‘ and might ‗prevent the growth of democracy‘.213 Willard argued 
that the ‗trend of world ideas‘ was behind Australia‘s position. The sense of nationality that 
had developed around the world, she pointed out, was in line with Australia‘s claims to a 
White Australia given the repeated admission of the international community to the rights 
self-determination.
214
 Hughes too had recognised that, even before it began, that the 
Conference was ultimately a meeting where the right to self-government would be a major 
issue:  
 Are we as Australians to come out of the Peace Conference shorn of some of our powers of self-
government? ... If we as a nation emerge from that Conference with any of our rights impaired, or fall 
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short of any of those things for which we have fought, we shall deserve any fate that comes upon us.
 
215
  
For Hughes the ―great heritage‖ of White Australia represented the ultimate right of self-
government; it indicated the right to choose what types of people made up a nation.  
However, while it is evident that White Australia was the method that many endorsed for the 
project of forming Australia into a progressive self-governed nation, the story of the racial 
equality clause indicates the complexity of using such a method for forming the nation. 
Evidence shows that many Australians, diverse but fragmented groups and individuals, 
challenged an unwavering view of White Australia because it was seen counter to forming a 
democratic, self-determined nation. Socialists, internationalists, medical and scientific figures, 
politicians, academics, members of the public service, informed men of the empire and 
bishops were all among those who continued to question how White Australia should work 
and whether it was the best way to guarantee Australian nationhood. These commentators 
looked at the episode of the clause and, for more than a decade after the blocking of Japan‘s 
amendment, played their part in sustaining the debate over the ideal of White Australia and 
the realities of becoming an international participant. They advocated for forming the same 
progressive institutions to further democratic nationhood, such as labour and economic 
standards, and the necessity to guarantee sovereignty by the defence of the nation‘s borders, 
as Hughes had done but to justify opinions that were completely removed from his. 
This raises the question of why the Japanese racial equality clause inspired such discussion in 
regards to Australia‘s quest to become a self-determined nation and White Australia. The 
answer lies in the development of Japan and Japanese nationality. It must be remembered that 
the story of the racial equality is also the story of both Australian and Japanese nationalism. 
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Japan had developed rapidly in the last half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth. In this short timeframe it was perceived to have evolved from a secluded, feudal 
country to a technologically advanced and militarily capable nation. Japan had won over 
Russia, a white power, and had secured the position of a ―great power‖; At Paris and in the 
League Japan was considered to be the only non-Anglo Saxon power.
216
 The clause was a 
Japanese declaration that, despite race, it was equal with the Western powers. Indeed when 
the clause was spoken of it was rarely discussed outside of being Japan‘s national aspiration. 
Why Japanese nationalism caused discussion over White Australia was simply because it 
clashed with aspects of that ideal and therefore raised doubt over the exclusionist policy. As 
demonstrated by the Round Table article of March 1921, White Australia was problematic in 
that if it should be recognised as a justified national aspiration on what grounds did Australia 
have in squashing Japan‘s legitimate national calls for racial equality or Japan‘s right to 
relieve its excess population?
217
    
Japan‘s national progress meant that traditional notions of the superiority of the white 
workers and white nations were challenged. Sections of the Australian public an unwavering 
affirmation of White Australia might cause a breakdown labour and defence conditions which 
they believed guaranteed Australian nationalism. These individuals were hence inclined to 
abandon a hard-line view of the policy or questioned the complete negativity against the 
claim of racial equality.  
As demonstrated, the racial equality proposal had inspired sections of Australians, almost 
always neglected in the histories of the episode, to questions hard-line views on White 
Australia. How could Australia claim progressive labour standards if its ―superior‖ white 
workers did not and possibly could not, populate and effectively work in the tropical areas of 
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Australia? How could sovereignty be maintained if Australia was unwilling to take necessary 
measures to populate the land, exploit its vast resources and avert the eyes of a land hungry 
Japan? Had the Japanese not proven that they strove for industrial progress by the creation of 
labour movements? If their conditions did improve on what grounds could Australians 
exclude them? If Australia continued insult Japan, which was a friend and ally, by its lack of 
concession and diplomatic tact did it not risk turning Japan into an enemy and security threat? 
These questions, among others, were asked to determine how, and sometimes even if, White 
Australia could address the problems of progression and self-determination inherent in the 
formation of an early twentieth century nation.  
Indeed it can be concluded that the questions surrounding White Australia continued for more 
than a decade after the Paris Peace Conference because of the rise of Japan as a militaristic 
nation. For imperial Japan the system of the League, as a regulator of international affairs, 
continued to conflict with what it believed were legitimate national goals. The doubts about 
White Australia reflect a fear that the policy may have simply backed Japan into a corner 
from whence to turn against the Western world, including Australia, and the conditions of 
Australian nationhood may have been lost via Japanese invasion.  
It has even been attested that the rejection of racial equality drove Japan to its militarised 
state and placed it on the path to war. Shimazu notes that in 1933 when Japan decided to 
withdraw from the League after it was condemned for occupying Manchuria, Japanese 
observers claimed that the rejection of racial equality had defeated any chance to establish 
world peace and had been abusive enough to justifying Japan‘s withdrawal.218 Similarly at 
the conclusion of the Second World War the Japanese emperor stated that if the reasons for 
the war were asked, the answer began with Versailles Conference and the denial of the 
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proposal.
219
 Even Justice Radhabinod Pal, the Indian judge on the International Military 
Tribunal of the Far East,
220
 attested as such. Pal voted to acquit the charges placed on 
Japanese war criminals on the grounds that the trial was illegitimate. One point he argued was 
that Japan had been provoked into war and had suffered abuses from the west such as the 
denial of racial equality. Pal later pointed the blame directly at Australia and Hughes: 
It was not Britain which stood in the way, but principally Australia; or rather it was a single 
Australian Mr Hughes who constituted himself champion of the cause of White supremacy. The 
Japanese delegation leader then had warned the world ominously of the consequences of refusing 
to accept the principle of equality of nations, but neither the League nor any other international 
organisation ever could get rid of that race feeling.
221
 
It should be noted that Hughes responded with vigour. He declared Pal‘s statements were 
‗fantastic‘ and that the actions taken at Paris were required to preserve the Australian nation. 
Hughes argued that if he had accepted the clause he would have been ‗a traitor to 
Australia.‘222 He even went as far as to claim that blocking of racial equality was fundamental 
to the allied victory in the Second World War as it had prevented hordes of militant Japanese 
from entering Australia. To Hughes the blocking of the clause hence preserved Australia, and 
this had allowed Australians to participate in Alamein, helping to secure victory there against 
the Germans and therefore preventing a chain reaction which led to an allied defeat. 
223
  
In sum these arguments over whether or not the denial of racial equality led the Pacific War 
or prevented defeat in it are but two aspects of a wider discussion, which is, whether 
affirmation of White Australia at Paris, when a challenge had been made to this notion by the 
Japanese proposal, had in fact served the development of the Australian nation or harmed it. 
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It is ironic perhaps that in the attempt to define  Australia as a nation at Versailles, and what 
White Australia truly meant for Australia‘s international relations, a extensive debate was 
inspired where the confusion over Australian nationalism was only further exacerbated.
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